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In Latin America, a social revolution is statistically far more likely  to fail than to 
succeed.  Yet there is little understanding as to the contributory factors of revolutionary 
failure or success.  Many researchers look for commonalities by  examining multiple 
revolutions across the region or even around the globe and throughout large periods of 
time, but their analysis frequently lacks commonality in the underlying conditions of the 
insurgencies.  The case of Peru, however, provides a unique opportunity to examine 
multiple revolutions in the fairly  homogenous environment of one state during a short 
and constrained timeframe of thirty years.  In the history of the Republic of Peru, there 
have been only four social revolutions.  These insurgencies were contained within two 
discreet periods of time:  the MIR and ELN in the 1960’s, and Shining Path and MRTA in 
the 1980’s to 1990’s.  While each of these revolutions experienced varying levels of 
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION
In the history of the Peruvian Republic,1  there have only been two significant 
periods of insurgency with the goal of “social revolution,” as defined by Skocpol, that is: 
the “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures […] 
accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.”2  Both of 
these periods of social revolution occurred in the latter part of the twentieth century.  Two 
separate insurgencies attempted revolution within each period — two during the 
mid-1960’s and two during the 1980’s to 1990‘s.  Prior to these insurgencies, internal 
armed conflict, rebellions, and uprisings in Peru were generally relegated to contests for 
power by various groups, factions, or political or military leaders with clear intentions of 
making changes, gaining control, and/or ruling within the existing political system.3 
Political usurpers prior to the mid-1960s may  have used methods that fell outside of these 
boundaries in their quest for power, but they always acknowledged (implicitly or 
explicitly) that their actions were exceptional.  Not until the Republic of Peru’s first 
period of attempted social revolution in the early 1960‘s did any significant revolutionary 
movement arise with the express aim of completely reconstructing the nation’s socio-
political structure.  
Two separate insurgencies, the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) 
led by Luís de la Puente, and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) led by Héctor 
Béjar, took up arms against the government in late 1964.  By the spring of 1966, De la 
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Puente was dead, Béjar was in prison, and both movements lay in ruins, having been 
eagerly crushed by the Peruvian military.  In the wake of their rapid and inglorious 
defeat, theories abounded surrounding the question of why these two movements failed. 
The guerrillas themselves — at least those who survived — believed their defeat  lay  in 
their lack of unity, short preparation time, tactical mistakes, and a lack of unity with the 
indigenous peasantry  of the sierra.4   On the other hand, the Peruvian armed forces and 
their U.S. advisors viewed the situation from a military power perspective: the well-
planned, thoroughly prepared, and forcefully  executed counterinsurgency campaign of 
the Peruvian Armed Forces led to decisive victory.5  Other academics and observers felt 
that the agrarian reforms of the 1962 military junta and later the Belaúnde administration 
dampened the potential for radicalization within the peasantry.  There is no doubt that 
each of these arguments has merit: the revolutionaries made countless tactical and 
strategic blunders, the military’s quick and forceful campaign essentially  annihilated 
guerrilla resistance, and land reforms did indeed ease peasant unrest.  Each of these three 
explanations, however, hinges on the assumption that a rural-based communist 
insurgency in 1960’s Peru could possibly have succeeded.  In this, all three are wrong.  
Just fifteen years later, a second, and much more turbulent period of insurgency 
began in 1980, running well into the mid-1990’s.  Sendero Luminoso (SL, or Shining 
Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) waged protracted, and 
much more successful, insurgency campaigns throughout Peru.  These groups, especially 
Sendero Luminoso, amassed a staggering death toll and left an indelible mark on 
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Peruvian society.  Like their 1960’s predecessors, the ultimate objective of both Sendero 
and MRTA was the replacement of the Peruvian state by a communist  government, but 
they  employed significantly different strategies.  Sendero Luminoso aimed to collapse the 
state completely  before moving to take over control of the country; their tactics earned 
them the reputation of “one of the most ruthless terrorist  groups in the Western 
Hemisphere.”6  Founder Abimael Guzmán quietly and patiently built  the ideological and 
military components of his organization over a period of ten years before initiating the 
lucha armada in 1980.  On the other hand, MRTA, and its leader Victor Polay, sought to 
create a “natural fusion of arms with the masses” by  providing an example of 
revolutionary  action to guide the population in their inevitable pending uprising and 
overthrow of the state.7   Polay  sought to provide an alternative to both the evils of the 
state and the extremism of its revolutionary counterpart Sendero.8
Initially, the Peruvian government did not take seriously the threat that Sendero 
Luminoso and MRTA posed to the state.  And indeed MRTA never became more than a 
footnote against  the extreme backdrop of violence surrounding Sendero.  Even in the 
mid-1980’s, as state security services clearly showed signs of losing ground to Sendero, 
most scholars still viewed the Shining Path as a worrisome but not a severe threat to Peru. 
Yet by the first  months of the 1990’s, with Peru’s economy in free-fall, the problem of 
Shining Path actions clearly  began to overwhelm Peruvian military and police services. 
For the first  time, observers began to advance the possibility that Sendero might topple 
the Peruvian State.9  
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Two short years later, the opposite situation existed in Peru.  The urban 
mobilizations predicted by Guzmán’s strategy failed to materialize.  Peru’s new president, 
Alberto Fujimori, commanded unprecedented popularity and voter confidence from all 
socioeconomic levels.  The government passed amnesty laws intended to encourage 
defections from Sendero’s base followers, and the military refined its strategy and 
enacted local comités de autodefensa to combat the Shining Path in its rural strongholds. 
The anti-terrorism police captured Abimael Guzmán in Lima; information gathered from 
his safe-house coupled with previously gathered intelligence produced a chain reaction of 
arrests of Shining Path leadership.  Sendero Luminoso began to break apart, and its 
viability as an effective insurgency  quickly waned.  Likewise, MRTA also could not 
translate tactical success into strategic gain.  State security forces arrested Polay  and 
decimated MRTA just a few months prior to capturing Guzmán.10   Nestor Cerpa 
Cartolini, Polay’s repacement, continued the fight, but MRTA led a subdued existence for 
the next four years.  Finally, in December 1996, Cerpa led the organization in its most 
spectacular operation by capturing over 600 hostages at the residence of the Japanese 
Ambassador in Lima.  Despite its audaciousness, in reality  this operation was a final 
convulsion from a dying organization.  Four months into the hostage operation, Peruvian 
Army commandos assaulted the compound and killed all of the militants.  With Cerpa 
and his militants died MRTA’s remaining hope of revolution.
Despite its considerable success in Peru’s rural highlands, Sendero Luminoso failed 
in its objective to mobilize the citizens of Lima and ultimately topple the government of 
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Peru.  The attempt by MRTA to provide an attractive revolutionary alternative to the 
Shining Path was equally fruitless.  Neither group ever gained a significant following in 
Lima; their influence throughout the country  continuously  declined throughout the 1980’s 
and plummeted in the 1990’s.11  After a decade of battling the Shining Path and MRTA, 
improved government counter-insurgency strategies and successful military and police 
operations of the early 1990’s provided some of the impetus for their ultimate decimation 
and marginalization.  But the actions of state security services alone cannot explain the 
ultimate failure of these revolutions.  Rather, the true nature of the defeat of Sendero 
Luminoso and MRTA lay much deeper in the fabric of Peru.
Che Guevara began his 1960 manifesto Guerrilla Warfare with the assertion that 
“popular forces can win a war against the Army” in “underdeveloped America” through a 
rural-based insurgency.  He further claimed that an insurrection need not wait “until all 
conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.”12   The 1959 
Communist social revolution in Cuba sparked the imaginations of radicals throughout 
Latin America; Che’s instruction manual in guerrilla tactics fanned the flames of 
revolution even higher, inspiring attempted revolutions throughout the continent.
About two and a half thousand miles separate the steamy, tropical island of Cuba 
from the cool mountain expanses and arid coastal deserts of Peru; more separates the two 
countries than mere physical distance and geography.  In revolutionary  Cuba there 
existed a set of structural, social, and (within the insurgencies) organizational conditions 
that were conducive for social revolution through popular mobilization and revolt.  The 
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same was true of both China and Russia during their respective twentieth century 
revolutionary  periods.  The insurgents of 1960’s and 1980’s Peru argued that their nation 
had sufficiently similar revolutionary characteristics.  Yet still they failed. 
What factors contributed to the failure of those four social revolution attempts in 
Peru to spawn popular mobilization?  My basic proposition is that the structural and 
sociopolitical characteristics of a functioning democracy  are not conducive to popular 
mobilization and successful revolution.  I focus on the dominant insurgent group  in each 
period of insurgency — the MIR during the 1960’s and Sendero Luminoso in the 1980’s 
and 90’s; I also selectively address the other two insurgent groups — ELN and MRTA — 
to provide additional context given their similarities and complimentary  ideals to the first 
two groups.  To answer my primary  question, I examine the problem from both a 
structural and a sociopolitical perspective.  I colocate my discussion of relevant theory in 
each chapter in order to facilitate the correlation of theory and analysis.  This paper 
examines four insurgencies in two discrete yet proximate timeframes within one medium-
sized country.  While I cannot draw universal conclusions from my results, I believe that 
this paper provides both a useful framework to analyze revolutionary insurgencies in 
other countries, as well as strong evidence that a functioning democracy  makes popular 
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CHAPTER II:  HISTORY AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF INSURGENTS
In order to understand the events surrounding the twentieth century  Peruvian 
insurgencies, it is useful to first understand the history and basic ideology  of the major 
actors.  In this chapter I first examine two significant formative influences on the 
revolutionaries:  the writings of José Carlos Mariátegui and the historical instability  of 
the Peruvian left.  I then examine the ideological and organizational formation of each of 
the insurgencies.  I review the MIR and ELN from the 1960‘s as a group given their 
proximity both ideologically and chronologically.  I discuss Sendero and MRTA 
separately  despite their coexistence.  Given the size and scope of Sendero’s operations, I 
provide a more detailed look into their origins and ideology as well as a brief overview of 
their operations.  
A PERUVIAN TWIST ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
The writings of José Carlos Mariátegui had significant influence on the Peruvian 
left, especially  the revolutionaries of the 1960’s and 1980’s.  Mariátegui was a Peruvian 
communist activist and writer in the early twentieth century.  Despite his death in 1930 at 
only thirty-five years of age, Mariátegui’s writings continue to hold significant political 
influence among the Peruvian left.  In his work Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de la 
Realidad Peruana (1928), Mariátegui argued that communism in Peru must necessarily 
be adapted to Peru’s unique characteristics.  Mariátegui’s writings presented an idealized 
view of Peruvian history in which he describes a form of agrarian collectivism that 
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supposedly existed before the arrival of the Spanish.  In the Incan empire, “collective 
work and common effort were employed fruitfully  for social purposes.”1  The Indians’ 
“humble and religious obedience to social duty” created a society that enjoyed “material 
comfort” until “the Spanish conquistadors destroyed” it, implementing a far inferior 
economic system meant to facilitate the extraction of “rich booty” from Peru.2 
Mariátegui used this idealized indigenous vs. European contrast, in part, to justify  the 
importance of the indigenous population in his Peruvian version of Marxism.
Central to his work was Mariátegui’s claim that “the Socialist  Party  [adapt] its 
praxis to the concrete circumstances of the country.”3  In his analysis, Peru did not have a 
bourgeois state and the urban proletariat was relatively small, accounting for only about 
one-fifths of the masses (the remaining four fifths being Indians and the rural proletariat). 
The impending social revolution would require a worker-peasant alliance since the power 
of the masses was found primarily in the indigenous peasantry.  The emphasis he placed 
on the Indian masses vis-á-vis the revolution put Mariátegui’s ideology at odds with 
Soviet Communism, as did his subordinating of class distinctions to race and ethnic 
issues.  
Mariátegui believed that within Peru three economies operated simultaneously: in 
the sierra both a feudal economy perpetuated by large haciendas and a small indigenous 
economy left over from the pre-colonial times co-existed; on the coast a mentally 
backward “bourgeois economy … growing in feudal soil” prevailed.4   He did not view 
the  role of the Peruvian coast, and particularly  the role of Lima as Peru’s capital, as 
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particularly important to Peru.  He charged that Lima’s dominance in Peru was an 
artificial remnant of the Conquistadors’ arbitrary placement of their colonial capital — a 
mere holdover from the days of Spanish.  Mariátegui theorized that the future importance 
of Lima would be determined almost solely on “whether first place in Peru’s social and 
political reform is given to the rural Indian masses or to the coastal proletariat.”5  Years 
later, Mariátegui’s ideas enjoyed  significant influence on the development of 
revolutionary ideologies among the Peruvian left.
THE LEFT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERU
The insurgents of both 1965 and 1980 had experienced a myriad of confusing and 
destabilizing political events in their lifetimes which likely contributed to their distorted 
views of reality.  From the death of Mariátegui in 1930 to the commencement of the early 
stages of the first rebellion in 1964, the Peruvian left faced a roller coaster of persecution 
and legitimacy  issues, identity crises, internal division and infighting, and a general lack 
of coherent leadership and direction.  Two primary  tensions explain the dysfunctionality 
of the left in the years leading up to the first insurgencies.  The first and most important 
tension was between the Peruvian military   and the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria 
Americana (APRA), a socialist political party founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre 
that historically maintained a troubled and often violent rivalry with the armed forces.  A 
second tension was between elements of the left  itself, between those who sought 
political legitimacy and those who favored extralegal action to include revolution.
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Haya de la Torre’s APRA and Mariátegui’s Partido Comunista del Perú (PCP) 
earned the animosity of, and repression by, the Peruvian military from their disruptive 
activities (such as strikes and student protests) among civil society and subversive 
activities within the ranks of the armed forces.6   Certainly friction between the left, 
especially APRA, and the military  existed before Luís Sanchez Cerro, framed in terms of 
those who are sworn to protect the status quo (to include the current administration) 
versus those with a desire and potential to make significant changes intra- and extra-
systemically.  But upon the assumption of power by (and later election of) Sanchez Cerro, 
the contention between these two social and ideological factions came to a head. 
President Sanchez Cerro was, after all, a lieutenant colonel in the Army; his replacement, 
Oscar Benavides, was a general officer.  Peru’s military  rulers from the 1930’s through 
1980 maintained a disdain for the ineptitude of civilians to guide Peru to functioning 
modernization and success — a precursor to the military anti-politics of the 1968 military 
junta.7  It  was one thing for the Peruvian military  to interfere in politics; APRA’s strong 
opposition to the military’s ostensibly  anti-political rule was an affront to, and distraction 
from, the important work Peru’s military  rulers attempted to accomplish.  In April of 
1933, a young Aprista radical assassinated President Sanchez Cerro, shooting him 
through the heart  as he was reviewing new Army recruits needed for Peru’s unpopular 
armed conflict with Colombia.8   And while a subsequent investigation determined that 
the assassin had acted alone, rumors spread that dissident members of the military, 
chiefly Benavides, were actually behind the assassination.9  Nevertheless, the political 
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killing confirmed for many military leaders the seriousness of the subversive threat 
APRA and the political left posed to the stability  of the Peruvian state.  Under the 
Benavides regime, a new wave of political repression commenced.10
Ironically, it is entirely  possible that much of APRA’s widespread appeal was due in 
part to their suffering under the military’s political oppression.  Under the military 
influence, both direct (when in power) and indirect (when allowing civilian rule) of the 
next fifty  years, APRA was alternately banned and legalized.  During the periods in 
which APRA was barred from the legal political scene, Haya de la Torre was able to gain 
a widespread following, “to be all things to all people.”11   Conversely, during those 
periods of legal political activity, APRA’s ideology would moderate.  This caused the 
radical left of the party endless frustration, causing many to become disillusioned and 
spurring some to abandon APRA and join forces with the PCP and other communist 
groups.12  Usually this was exacerbated by the manner in which APRA emerged from 
“underground.”  For example, newly legalized after a long (1931-1945) period of being 
exiled under military  presidencies, APRA supported the candidacy  of soon-to-be 
President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero in a successful bid to win significant seats in the 
Peruvian Congress, gaining 40% of the Senate.13  Again exiled by  Army General and 
President Manuel Odría after his coup d’état in 1948, Haya de la Torre lived in exile-
cum-captivity in the Colombian embassy in Lima for six years. 
In an effort to bring APRA back into legitimacy  again, in 1956 Haya de la Torre 
moved the party to the right, supported the candidacy of soon-to-be President Manuel 
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Prado, and again made significant gains in both houses.  The partnership  between Prado 
and APRA began a period of convivencia between APRA and the Prado administration. 
Haya de la Torre used this period to position himself for winning the presidency.  In the 
1962 presidential elections, Haya de la Torre became the presidential frontrunner but 
failed to gain the necessary one-third of votes.  Proving how ideologically limber APRA 
could be, APRA partnered with former President  Odría’s party Unión Nacional Odriista 
(UNO) in a bid to return Odría to the presidency (and gain significant traction in the new 
administration.  This prompted the military  to annul the election, seize power in yet 
another coup d’état, and reschedule the elections for the following year.  Though they  did 
not gain the presidency in 1963, the APRA-UNO coalition settled for a consolidation of 
political power within the Peruvian congress.  In a twist of irony, APRA-UNO frequently 
flexed their political muscles in opposition to the land (and other) reforms of President 
Belaúnde, stagnating progress on the very  issues they had long touted.  For the radical 
leftists, APRA and convivencia represented an abdication of the moral authority Haya de 
la Torre had built among the left during the early years of the Odría administration.  
The moderation and entry into the mainstream by APRA caused serious rifts among 
the Peruvian left.  There is no question that the Peruvian left suffered oppression from 
established state powers.  But perhaps the greatest barrier they faced in advancing their 
ideology was self-imposed.
Throughout the twentieth century, the discord within the Peruvian left consistently 
prevented any unified attempt — be it legal, extra-legal, or revolutionary — of 
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establishing social change.  When APRA was founded in 1924, there was no communist 
or socialist  party in Peru.  Many Peruvian leftists gravitated towards what was, at the 
time, the only socialist-leaning game in town.  Haya de la Torre wanted to transform 
APRA from a mere alliance “‘alliance’ or coalition of socialists, communists and 
bourgeois radicals ... [into] an independent party.”14   Some within APRA, to include 
Mariátegui, resisted this move; by 1928, the schism between Haya de la Torre and 
Mariátegui had grown too large to be repaired, and Mariátegui withdrew his support for 
APRA.  That same year, Mariátegui and his followers founded the Peruvian Socialist 
Party (PSP), and subsequently  declared his opposition to APRA.  The first  of many major 
rifts in the Peruvian left  was thus born.  One month after Mariátegui’s death in 1930, the 
PSP changed its name to become the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP).  By the 1950’s, 
APRA and the PCP remained the two primary, though by  no means exclusive, 
representations of the Peruvian left.15
Discontent with the actions, or lack thereof, of APRA and the PCP by the more 
radical members of the Radical left soon began to create irreversible rifts within these 
two parties.  Haya de la Torre’s APRA party was the first to see significant defections. 
Notably, APRA’s alliance with former dictator Manuel Odría and its large center-ward 
shift in the mid 1950’s greatly  angered the radical wing of APRA.  The PCP was also not 
immune to internal dissent; many radical leftists became disillusioned by the PCP’s 
failure to translate revolutionary doctrine into action.16 Some of these radicals left APRA 
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and the PCP in the early 1960’s to form the Trotskyist Frente de la Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (FIR).
In 1958, just a few years prior to the first revolutionary period, a trotskyite named 
Hugo Blanco began organizing peasant unions in the southern sierra.  Born in Cuzco and 
fluent in Quechua, Blanco returned from Lima to his hometown as a representative of the 
Peruvian Trotskyist party  Partido Obrero Revolucionario, or POR, in 1958.  The POR 
sent Blanco to build alliances with the Cuzco Workers Federation (FTC).  Blanco, upon 
finding that the FTC was not an organization of industrial workers, but rather of artisans 
and peasants.  Blanco soon became active in the local peasant union, and later, the 
Provincial Peasants Federation of La Convención (FPCC).  His peasant organizations 
conducted numerous strikes in the early 1960’s.  His work with the FPCC and the POR 
led to the creation of the FIR in 1961, which essentially served as a vanguard party of the 
POR.17  
In 1962, the FIR initiated a campaign of land seizures in La Convención.  Although 
these invasions were not intended to function as the initiation of a revolutionary 
campaign, these seizures greatly  concerned the ruling military junta (of 1962-63).  The 
military government sent the Peruvian Guardia Civil to evict the invaders and capture the 
leadership.  Initially Blanco evaded the Guardia Civil, but was eventually  captured in late 
May of 1963.  The unrest continued for months until the military junta initiated limited 
agrarian reform in the south-central sierra.18  Ironically, while many in the Peruvian left 
agreed with Blanco’s actions, they refused to support him materially or financially 
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because of the ideological and doctrinal disagreements between leftist groups in Peru. 
This disunity foreshadowed to the events of 1965, where the two separate communist 
insurgencies independently planned and executed their revolutions within a few miles of 
each other.19  
MIR AND ELN
The moderation of APRA and apathy of the PCP created other divisions within the 
left.  Ironically, it was small splinter groups from these divisions, not elements of the 
mainstream Peruvian left, that led the first true revolutionary uprisings in Peruvian 
history.  These two groups were the MIR and the ELN.
In 1959, a group  of disaffected left-wing Apristas led by Luís de la Puente Uceda 
formed a faction within APRA called the “Comité Aprista Rebelde.”  De la Puente, a 
lawyer with a passion for agrarian reform, was a student of Che Guevara’s foco theory  of 
revolutionary  warfare, as was his contemporary in the ELN, Héctor Béjar.  De la Puente 
visited Cuba in 1959, shortly after Castro’s successful revolution, and came to believe 
that armed revolution was necessary to create a communist society in Peru.  The leftists 
in Comité Aprista Rebelde grew increasingly dissatisfied with the rightward movement of 
their party and its collusion with former military dictator Manuel Odría.  Unable to affect 
the center-ward trend of APRA, in 1960 the group  formally cut ties to APRA and became 
“APRA Rebelde.”  By early1962, the group changed its name again to the Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria, or MIR, in order further distance themselves from APRA. 20  
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Considered the “premier guerrilla theoretician in Peru” of the 1960’s,  De la Puente 
crafted MIR’s ideology around a peasant-based movement.21  Agrarian reform took center 
stage in APRA Rebelde cum MIR’s ideological platform.  De la Puente even met with 
Hugo Blanco near Cuzco shortly before the latter’s land invasion campaign; true to form 
for the Peruvian left, the two radical leftists disagreed on enough issues that  De la Puente 
withheld MIR support from Blanco and the FIR’s campaign.  De la Puente believed that 
the conditions for revolution were present but not mature in Peru, and that the revolution 
— a guerrilla movement first, then a regular army in the Cuban model — must start in the 
sierra.  The mission of the guerrillas was to develop the party and mobilize the masses, 
which he believed required several fronts given the size of Peru.  In the early 1960’s, the 
MIR began to secretly create resistance networks within the zones they would later use as 
guerrilla bases.  Guerrillas from the MIR travelled to China and Russia for training; with 
funds and support from these governments, they moved weapons and ammunition into 
Peru from Brazil and Chile.  By 1964, the MIR was ready to act.22
Like the MIR, the ELN too believed that the party  should grow out of the 
revolutionary  struggle.  However, its leader Béjar did not exhibit nearly the same 
organizational and planning skills of his contemporary.  The ELN “did not put much 
effort” into developing its program, preferring to create its doctrine and strategy on the 
fly.23  The ELN’s objectives centered around agrarian reform and a socialist government, 
which Béjar believed could only  be attained through “armed struggle and popular 
unity.”24
17
In February  of 1964, Luís de la Puente gave a speech in the Plaza San Martín in 
Lima, declaring the beginning of the MIR’s revolutionary  operations.  Shortly  after that, 
the MIR guerrillas deployed to three fronts in the sierra of Peru and began to construct 
their base-camps.  De la Puente set up  his headquarters on the Mesa Pelada, a remote 
mountain in La Convención province, a few miles away from Machu Picchu.  He also 
used this base as the headquarters for the southern front, nicknamed “Pachacutec.”  In 
preparation for the upcoming conflict, the MIR revolutionaries dug trenches and bunkers, 
stockpiled weapons, ammunition, and food, and placed land-mines on the avenues of 
approach to their camp.  About two-hundred miles to the northwest, in the mountains of 
Concepción province, Guillermo Lobatón set up  a similar base-camp for the central front, 
the “Túpac Amaru.”  Finally, on the northern border of Peru near Piura, Gonzalo 
Fernandez began preparing the northern “Manco Cápec” front.  In addition to preparing 
their base-camps, the MIR guerrillas spent time organizing the peasantry in their 
respective areas of operation.25  By the beginning of 1965, the MIR guerrillas were ready 
to openly challenge the Peruvian State.
In contrast to the deliberate preparations exhibited by the MIR, the ELN guerrillas 
under Héctor Béjar did not deploy to their chosen are of operations until April of 1965. 
The ELN chose Chinchibamba, near Ayacucho, for their base of operations.  In his book, 
Béjar recounts the difficulties that his small band of guerrillas experienced in establishing 
their front, the “Javier Heraud.”  The guerrillas entered their area of operations in April, 
which is the middle of fall in the Peruvian highlands, yet  they  did not bring coats or cold-
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weather clothing.  Neither did they speak any Quechua, the native tongue of the peasantry 
in much of the southern Peruvian highlands.  As a result of their poor preparation, they 
encountered significant difficulties living and communicating with their target audience. 
The ELN guerrillas were predominantly  from Lima, where the temperature remains mild 
throughout the year and the indigenous migrants speak Spanish.  They  clearly were not 
familiar with the peoples and topography of their chosen field of battle.  Their failure to 
research or reconnoiter their area of operations demonstrated the ideological naivete of 
the ELN.  Undaunted by their setbacks, however, Béjar and his guerrillas soon made 
headway in organizing the local population, primarily winning over the peasantry  by 
providing basic medical assistance.  The ELN had maintained contact with the MIR since 
1962, and knew that De la Puente’s organization was preparing revolutionary operations; 
however, standing disputes between the two groups over leadership and philosophy 
prevented them from coordinating their actions.26  Béjar did not realize that he had placed 
his base-camp almost directly between the MIR’s southern and central fronts; when MIR 
guerrillas initiated armed conflict in early June, the ELN felt obliged to do the same, 
despite their recent arrival into the sierra and their incomplete preparations.
In June of 1965, the MIR guerrillas initiated their armed actions by  blowing up a 
highway bridge and attacking a mine, multiple haciendas, and a police station.  The 
Peruvian government sent in the Guardia Civil, who found the insurgents more difficult 
to dislodge than Hugo Blanco in 1963.  Blanco did not use (nor believe in) guerrilla 
tactics; many of the MIR guerrillas had trained in unconventional warfare in China and 
19
Russia.  The Guardia Civil quickly realized that it was neither trained nor organized for 
the kind of guerilla warfare the groups used.  The insurgents enjoyed relatively  high 
success against the Guardia Civil by using ambushes, raids, and other asymmetric tactics. 
In addition to whatever clandestine support existed, Russia and Cuba provided overt 
moral approval through broadcasts over Radio Moscow and Radio La Havana — the 
latter even broadcast  in Quechua.  Unsettled by  the strength of the uprising and the 
guerrillas’ foreign connections, the military pressured President Belaúnde to hand them 
responsibility for counterinsurgency  operations.  On 2 July, Belaúnde gave the armed 
forces authority to intervene in the situation, and two days later suspended civil liberties 
in the region for thirty days.  The situation concerned the military enough that they 
threatened Belaúnde with a coup unless he gave them total control of the situation, which 
he did on 14 July.  Furthermore, the generals pressed for and received from congress a 
law placing the guerrillas’ actions under jurisdiction of the military justice system.27
Once the armed services had permission to act, they wasted no time directing their 
resources against their foe.  They used almost all of the tools in their arsenal to combat 
the guerrillas, including such newly  acquired assets as helicopters, napalm, and infrared 
photography.  De la Puente’s Pachacutec front first clashed with the Army on 9 
September.  By 20 September the Army had built base-camps and two combat roads to 
access the Mesa Pelada.  The air force conducted saturation air strikes using napalm and 
conventional bombs, and the Army  riddled the area with machine-gun fire, forcing De la 
Puente’s southern front to withdraw.  With the help of a defector from the MIR, the Army 
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conducted their final assault onto the Pachacutec camp.  The survivors of Pachacutec 
tried to escape with some of the survivors to a nearby town, but the Army intercepted 
them and killed De la Puente — presumably in combat — on 23 October.  Lobatón’s 
center front fared better than that of his leader De la Puente.  His group, which had 
conducted the most actions against the state and landholders, actually bore the brunt of 
Army and Air Force attacks.  Yet the Túpac Amaru group continued to fight until early 
January of 1966.  Behind the other two groups in combat preparations, the northern 
Manco Cápec front never began operations.  The Army gathered intelligence about the 
northern front from captured guerrilla fighters and moved quickly to captured them in 
December, before they could fire a shot.28  
Ironically, Héctor Béjar of the ELN outlasted all of the other guerrilla leaders.  The 
least prepared and smallest insurgent group  conducted some insignificant  raids on 
haciendas, and did not present a major threat to the Army compared to the neighboring 
MIR fronts.  A case of dumb luck, the ELN’s lack of preparation and ineffectiveness 
spared it the brunt of the Army’s wrath.  Béjar and his small band of guerrillas played 
“hide and seek” with the Army until mid-December, when an Army unit ambushed them 
at Tincoy.  Béjar and many of his guerrillas escaped and survived as fugitives.  The 
military killed or captured some of the ELN fighters, others fled to Bolivia and joined 
Che Guevara’s ill-fated expedition there.  Béjar himself wound up a prisoner of the 
Army; he was the only senior guerrilla leader who survived.29
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MRTA
Armed elements of the MIR and ELN insurgencies were decimated by the Peruvian 
Armed Forces in 1965.  But the MIR as an organization did not die with founder Luís de 
la Puente on the Mesa Pelada.  Rather, those in the MIR who survived the failed uprising 
of 1965 maintained their faith in De la Puente’s words:  “el camino de la revolución es el 
único camino que le queda a nuestro pueblo.”30  By 1967, the surviving MIR members 
had organized into various splinter groups, such as MIR-EM  (MIR El Militante), MIR IV 
(MIR 4th Stage), MIR Voz Rebelde, and even a coalition of five various factions called 
“MIR de la Confluencia-Grupo de los Cinco,” or MIR-5.  In 1976, other radical leftists 
created the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR) to protest the military  junta’s failure 
to complete its original reforms.  The PSR had two wings--one public, the other 
clandestine (“la Orga”).  Within two years, the ideology and politics of the two wings had 
diverged considerably; the more radical “Orga” members left the PSR and created the 
PSR-ML (for “Marxista- Leninista”).  The PSR-ML and the MIR-EM had in common, 
among other things a belief in the use of force as the only way to gain power in Peru. 31
In 1978, the methodical return to democracy, which began through the elections of a 
constitutional assembly, gave rise to many political coalitions.  The MIR-EM initially 
joined the Unión Democrático Popular (UDP), but soon broke its ties with the UDP 
because the coalition would not support a platform of legal political discourse supported 
by armed action.  Prior to the 1980 national elections, the PSR and UDP joined the 
Unidad de Izquierda (UI); a requirement of their membership was the exclusion of their 
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radical left wings.  The MIR-EM  and PSR-ML, both effectively excluded from the legal 
political process, began to work closely together.  In May of 1980 they issued a joint 
declaration that the return to democracy did not change the underlying structural 
conditions of Peru, which was still in a pre-revolutionary stage; they proclaimed their 
preparations for revolution.  In June of the same year with the aim of furthering their 
desire to unite under shared vision for militant revolution in Peru.  The resulting 
organization which emerged from the conference called itself PSR-ML--MIR-EM.  By 
September, the two organizations changed their prognosis of the Peruvian situation to that 
of “revolutionary.”32
By 1982, the groups had continued to work together.  As they considered the rapid 
growth, in only two years of armed campaign, of Sendero Luminoso, they decided that 
the time was ripe to begin their own armed struggle.  In March of that year, the PSR-
ML--MIR-EM became the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), the name 
Túpac Amaru used to honor one of the MIR fronts during 1965.  By September of 1983, 
MRTA had finished preparing for its armed actions, and in early  1984 it  initiated its 
campaign.  In June of 1984, the group issued its first communiqué revealing its 12-part 
platform.  The platform declared that MRTA was “continuing down ‘the path chartered by 
Luís de la Puente.’”33  In this platform, MRTA proclaimed armed struggle as the path to 
reforming Peruvian society, and called on a wide variety of elements within society to 
join them.  In this respect, MRTA viewed revolution in a much more eclectic manner than 
their counterpart Sendero Luminoso.  At the same time, MRTA has not lost its roots in the 
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MIR, maintaining that the peasantry  held great importance in the revolution.  Playing 
catch-up with Sendero, MRTA proclaimed its first armed action to have occurred two 
years earlier, in May  of 1982.  Their self-comparison with the Shining Path led them to 
base part of their revolutionary appeal on being a moderate but still armed revolutionary 
group between the legal (and in their view impotent) left, and the extreme revolutionary 
violence of Sendero.
Polay’s MRTA never was able to make much headway in their armed revolution; 
they  always operated as a relatively minor second-rate operation compared to the 
relatively overwhelming influence of the Shining Path.  Many scholars view MRTA’s 
insurgency failure as, in part, a result of Sendero’s ability to crowd them out of the 
revolutionary  “market.”  It  is true that Sendero’s superior organizational abilities, greater 
level of preparation, and stronger ideology structure likely  contributed to MRTA’s 
marginalization.  However, Sendero had some other positive and negative effects on 
MRTA.  First, by the time MRTA began their armed conflict, the Peruvian state had 
already mobilized and been at war for four years with Shining Path.  The militants from 
MRTA, on the other hand, were just tasting their first encounters with guerrilla combat 
operations.  The extreme violence initiated by Sendero had also forced the legal Peruvian 
left into partnerships with the government, virtually  closing off any  remaining 
opportunities for MRTA to gain leftist support.  By the time Shining Path had declined 
enough for MRTA to emerge from the shadow of also-ran, the state, military, and civil 
society anti-insurgency  structures implemented to counter Sendero were somewhat 
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refined, functioning fairly well, and more than capable to keep MRTA at bay.  These same 
institutions have decimated MRTA leadership as much or more as they had that of 
Sendero, leading to MRTA’s last-gasp effort to revive their revolution through the 
1996-1997 Japanese Ambassador’s Residence hostage operation.  But Nestor Cerpa, 
MRTA’s leader in the mid-1990’s, seriously underestimated the Peruvian state and 
military’s revival.  Three years of declining insurgency effectiveness after the capture of 
MRTA’s Polay and Sendero’s Guzmán had given the state sufficient opportunity to 
restore its sources of power.  Even had this hostage operation ended with some sort of 
amnesty for the hostage-takers, MRTA as an armed revolution was certain to certain to 
fade from existence.  As it was, the Peruvian military’s Operación Chavín de Huántar, in 
a stunning (and quickly tainted) show of tactical competence, executed an amazing 
hostage rescue operation, suffering the death of only  one hostage and two army 
commandos.  All fourteen MRTA militants were killed.  The initial account by military 
personnel was that all fourteen died in active combat with the military commandos. 
However, evidence indicates that at least some of the fourteen militants were summarily 
executed after their capture.34  Nevertheless, the operation and resulting death of most of 
MRTA’s remaining leadership  spelled the effective end of MRTA as  an operational 
insurgency.
SENDERO LUMINOSO:  HISTORY
The viciousness exhibited by Sendero Luminoso in their quest for social revolution 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s shocked the world.  Perhaps equally  disturbing was the 
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degree of premeditation founder Abimael Guzmán invested in his terrorist organization to 
prepare it  for a prolonged struggle against the state.  While Sendero Luminoso 
commenced its lucha armada in 1980, the organization had actually began as a 
revolutionary  movement in 1970, and the roots of Sendero’s ideology reach back further 
still. 35
Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso was born in a small coastal town in the 
department of Arequipa in 1934.  Born out of wedlock, he lived the first few years of his 
life with his biological mother; when he was only  five years old, she passed away and 
Abimael went to live with his uncles.  Guzmán’s father, a relatively well-to-do import 
wholesale businessman, took custody of young Abimael a few years later.  After living in 
Lima with his father and mother-in-law for a brief period, the family eventually resettled 
into a prosperous neighborhood in the city of Arequipa.  Guzmán attended a prestigious 
catholic high school, and was known for being both a good student and one “who had ten 
times as much pocket money as his class mates.”36  Guzmán developed a close and loving 
relationship  with his stepmother that he maintained even during his Shining Path years. 
Conversely, he harbored deep  resentment toward his father.  This sentiment was 
reciprocated by the elder Guzmán; a family  acquaintance remarked that “his father 
wishes Abimael was dead.”37
At age nineteen he entered the university  in Arequipa to study law and philosophy. 
He acquired as friends and mentors a philosophy professor named Miguel Rodríguez 
Rivas, who introduced him to Kantian philosophy, and left-wing painter Carlos de la 
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Riva, who introduced Guzmán to communism.  It is from these mentors that Guzmán 
gained extremist views.  Rodríguez Rivas’ Kantian intellectualism was rigid and fervent; 
a colleague noted that “he was [so] crazy [that]…if his thinking suffered a deviation it 
could take him anywhere in the world, and he would follow it…following sacred 
Reason.”38   Carlos de la Riva was “an undiluted Stalinist,” later a fervent adherent of 
Mao, who felt that “Communist parties…must be unyielding, stoic, aggressive…[with] 
dialectic methodology ferociously carried out.”39   From Rivas, Guzmán acquired his 
fanatical devotion to reason and methodology; from de la Riva, he inherited a devout 
adherence to Maoism.
In 1962, Guzmán joined the faculty  of the newly re-opened National University of 
San Cristóbal del Huamanga in Ayacucho.  Hidden away in the Andes, in 1962 the city of 
Ayacucho represented one of the lesser developed areas of Peru.  There was rampant 
poverty  and an abundance of traditional semi-feudal haciendas; the Catholic Church 
maintained a strong influence on the region.  The university’s influence was a significant 
factor that influenced change in the region.  Students at the university  took a mandatory 
first-year course, taught by Guzmán, on “scientific concept.”  This course taught concepts 
such as Darwinian evolution, dialectical materialism, and a Marxist view of religion.40 
One of Guzmán’s former pupils explained the effect this class had on many students: 
“until the day we graduated from high school all of us believed [in] Adam and … Eve. 
Once we had learned that the Bible could be wrong, everything was up for grabs.”41 
Guzmán and other like-minded professors at the university began an intentional 
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indoctrination of students.  This process, though not coordinated at first, evolved over 
time.  Guzmán and his fellow communists used the university, in part, as a communist 
indoctrination academy, and Guzmán himself earned the nickname “Shampoo…because 
he [washes] your brains, [cleans] your thoughts when confused [and clarifies] problems 
… he has an answer for everything.”42
While teaching at  the university, Guzmán became deeply involved with the local 
Partido Comunista del Perú (PCP) in Ayacucho.  When the PCP fractured in 1964, 
following the Sino-Soviet split, Guzmán’s passion and devotion to Maoism quickly 
elevated him to a senior leadership  position of the pro-China faction, the PCP-Bandera 
Roja.  The fractures in the Peruvian left created ideological chasms despite apparent 
similarities in goals and objectives.  When the Cuban-sponsored and inspired MIR and 
ELN began their revolutions, the PCP-Bandera Roja refrained from supporting their 
actions.  Apparently instructed by its backers in Beijing not to assist these Cuban-
sponsored insurgencies, Guzmán earnestly struggled to convince his zealous followers 
not to join in the fight.  The uprisings of 1965 brought a swift and effective military 
response against the insurgents and unwanted government attention to the Peruvian 
highlands; despite the Maoist camp’s abstinence from the insurgencies, Guzmán fled to 
China to avoid arrest.  While in China, Guzmán attended a Chinese insurgency cadre 
school, where he gained, among other things, substantial training in the subversive use of 
explosives.  
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Upon his return to Peru, Guzmán began to consolidate the power of the PCP-
Bandera Roja and develop the ideological base that would later form the tenets of 
Sendero Luminoso.  At the university, Guzmán obtained the position of director of 
personnel, which he used to winnow the faculty into predominately party adherents, and 
created an education program that recruited party members as primary school teachers for 
regional schools, bringing communist indoctrination to the emerging generation.  An 
initial “admirer of Castro,” Guzmán soon came to believe that Castro’s foco model of 
rural-based insurgency was a “petit bourgeois militaristic deviation doomed to sure 
defeat,” preferring the Chinese “People’s War model,” in which “political work was 
central and military actions only a complement.”43   Guzmán’s extremism reinforced his 
growing distaste for the Cuban revolutionary  philosophy.  When the pro-Moscow PCP 
and even the Cuban government expressed support for the ruling military  junta’s left-
wing reforms, he viewed this as a betrayal of communism.  He also found his own PCP-
Bandera Roja party  deficient in zeal: in 1970, Guzmán and his most devout followers 
split from the party to form their own party, the “Partido Comunista del Perú en el 
Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariátegui,” also known as the PCP-SL or Sendero 
Luminoso (SL).
In 1970, as Guzmán gained authority  within the PCP-SL, he and his fellow 
communists also controlled many important personnel and student functions within the 
University  of Huamanga.  He used his dominance of both organizations from 1970-1972 
to grow his organization from the ranks of the university and “acquire the ‘correct 
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line.’”44   Guzmán and Sendero incurred a significant loss of influence at the university 
from 1973-1978, but this did not stop Shining Path from continuing its internal process of 
introspection and ideological evolution.  In the final years of preparation from 
1977-1980, Sendero developed regional committees and cells throughout Peru as it 
formed its national structure.  During this time, SL began an intense “vilification 
campaign against the rest of the revolutionary left,” denouncing any leftists concessions 
to the Peruvian state as traitorous.45   This uncompromising repudiation of the Peruvian 
left was a mainstay of Sendero ideology throughout its dominant years. 
In March 1980,  Guzmán convinced Sendero’s Central Committee that it was time 
to begin armed struggle against the government.  Throughout 1980, the Central 
Committee continued to debate the final form Sendero’s strategy would take.  Guzmán 
articulated a strategy of “prolonged rural guerrilla war that  originates in the countryside 
eventually encircling and forcing the collapse of the towns.”46  A rival strategy put forth 
by a faction led by Luís Kawata and dubbed the “Albanian Line” gave equal emphasis 
“to armed actions in town and country.”47  Guzmán’s strategy  prevailed, and Kawata was 
ostracized and marginalized by  Sendero.  That April, Sendero held its first military 
school.  In May the organization stepped onto the national stage by  burning ballot boxes 
in the small village of Chuschi near Ayacucho and in Lima and Ayacucho by  hanging 
dogs from lamp posts.48  The guerra popular had begun in earnest.
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SENDERO LUMINOSO:  IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY
Sendero Luminoso took great lengths to marry political ideology and military 
action.  Guzmán, who often used an alias of Presidente Gonzalo, emphatically believed 
that the armed insurrection must always remain subordinate to the political line. 
Sendero’s political line, derived under the heavy-handed guidance of Guzmán, viewed 
the true line of communist ideology as “Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought.”49  The 
idea was that Marx provided the concept of class struggle, Lenin developed the 
“dictatorship of the proletariat,” Mao conceived of the rural revolution, and Mariátegui 
(who remained unmentioned in this pantheon of heroes) envisioned a “nationalistic 
domestic Third World revolution.”50   Within the decade, Shining Path doctrine boldly 
changed this phrase to “‘Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong-Gonzalo Thought’, or even just 
'Gonzalo Thought,”51  with Presidente Gonzalo fulfilling his role as a “living guide” to 
interpret and formulate the synthesis of the four previous ideologues.52  
Guzmán’s admiration of Mao and Mariátegui is clearly evident in Sendero’s 
ideology and strategy, although he often misinterpreted and misapplied their 
philosophies.  Similar to Mariátegui assessments of Peru, Mao viewed revolutionary 
China as a semi-feudal state whose revolutionary power lay  outside of the urban centers 
with the peasantry.  Thus for Mao and the Communist Party  of China (CPC), control over 
ever-increasing portions of rural China was key to their success.  Mao’s strategy centered 
around  three-phases: the “strategic defensive,” the “strategic equilibrium” or 
“stalemate,” and the “strategic counter-offensive.”53  During the strategic defense phase, 
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Mao’s armed forces were militarily inferior to the Kuomintang (KMT) government 
forces.  To preserve his combat strength and compensate for the disparity, Mao developed 
a strategy of targeting vulnerable KMT units and avoiding strong forces.  He described 
this strategy as pitting “one against ten” at the strategic level, yet always pitting “ten 
against one” tactically.54   In order to maintain the correct party line consistently 
throughout the revolution, Mao created a highly centralized leadership structure that 
maintained firm strategic control of the revolution.  At the same time, Mao pushed 
operational and routine decision-making down to his field commanders in order to 
encourage initiative and permit tactical flexibility.  During the rural campaign, Mao built 
support bases in the countryside among the peasantry.  This not only  provided supplies 
and recruits for his army, but also reduced counter-revolutionary  opportunities by the 
peasantry in these areas.  Rural support bases also provided a captive audience for the 
early adoption of CPC’s political agenda.  As Mao’s military gained ground, the rural 
support bases continually  grew and eventually  grew together, allowing his army to 
encircle and capture cities and towns.  In effect the CPC grew communist China one 
support base at a time.
Guzmán’s adherence to their theories, especially  those of Mao, bordered on 
obsession.  Where the ideas of Mao and Mariátegui conflict, Guzmán would give 
preference to Mao.  A prime example was Guzmán’s rejection of Mariátegui’s race-based 
philosophy in favor of Mao’s primacy of the class struggle.55  Guzmán and Shining Path 
leadership had strong ties to communist China, and Guzmán was known to have travelled 
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to China on at least three occasions56; Sendero sent many other members of its cadre to 
China for training as well during the twelve years of partnership prior to Deng Xiaoping’s 
coup of 1976.57  After breaking off relations with China in 1978, Sendero lost  its only 
external ally; at this point Guzmán and the leadership  of the Shining Path felt as if they 
were the only true communists, the “beacon of world revolution,” and declared Guzmán 
“the ‘fourth sword of Marxism,’ after Marx, Lenin, and Mao.”58  But Sendero’s radical 
adherence and loyalty to Maoism was not diminished, as evidenced by the dogs they 
hung from lampposts in Lima in 1980 bearing signs that read “Deng Xiaoping, son of a 
bitch.”59
Guzmán promoted four themes of “Gonzalo Thought:” “primacy of the class 
struggle,” the removal of imperialist influences from Peru, the necessity  of a vanguard 
party, and most importantly, the “universal law” of violence.60  Like Mao, Guzmán firmly 
believed that ideology   (the “party line”61) must guide action.  During the Shining Path’s 
military school in April of 1980, Guzmán ensured that his followers understood Mao’s 
exhortation on maintaining political control: “When the party line is correct, we have it 
all: if we have no guns, we shall get them and if we do not have power, we shall conquer 
it.  If the line is incorrect, we will lose everything that  we have gained.”62  From their 
political line, Guzmán established the party’s objectives: “‘the destruction of the Peruvian 
state' … expropriation of all foreign assets … confiscation of property owned by 
'bureaucratic capitalism', both private and public … and a ‘liquidation of semi-feudal 
property’ by applying the principle of ‘land to the tiller.’”63  
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The composition of the revolution decided on by the Central Committee was based 
on the political line that the peasantry should be led by the proletariat, with the party 
always in an overall supreme leadership role to ensure the maintenance of the party line. 
The petty bourgeoisie and, to a much lesser extent, the national bourgeoisie, would be 
allowed to participate but would be kept subordinate to the truly  revolutionary classes.64 
Sendero claimed that while under Mao, the Party, the guerrilla army, and the new 
communist state “were interrelated,” Guzmán’s “greatest  political innovation” was to 
make the party “the hub around which the army and then the state are built.”65  
Mao, unlike Mariátegui, also provided proven military strategies desperately needed 
by Sendero.  This was extremely  important to Guzmán.  The general consensus among 
scholars is that though Presidente Gonzalo was a brilliant manipulator, imaginative he 
was not.  Thus Guzmán and Sendero “uncritically  [adopted] ideas from Mariátegui and 
Mao … they were plagiarists rather than innovators.”66   Key to Sendero’s appropriated 
philosophical and military strategies was the premise that  Peru in 1980 was a semi-feudal 
country  with a powerful peasantry ripe for revolution.  Guzmán claimed that “sixty 
percent of the population are peasants who through having too little land of their own are 
forced into servitude.”67  As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, this statement was at 
best wishful thinking — Peru’s census bureau gives a rural population in 1981 of thirty-
five percent.68
Nevertheless, Sendero built its military  strategy on a rural-based revolution. 
Guzmán, taking a page from Mao, envisioned the same three strategic phases of 
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revolution: “strategic defense”, “strategic equilibrium”, and “strategic offensive.”69 
Sendero documents from 1980 reveal that the Central Committee devised a list of 
conditions required for the success of the revolution: 1) popular support  for the revolution 
manifested through active participation, 2) endurance and moral agreement among the 
populace for the revolution, 3) revolutionary  leadership  nucleus capable of conducting 
the revolution and seizing power, 4) a unified revolutionary movement, and 5) a popular 
revolutionary  army.70  These conditions were not prerequisites of revolution; rather they 
appear to be objectives the party must achieve before the revolution can advance from the 
strategic defense to the strategic equilibrium.71   From Guzmán’s borrowed strategic 
phases, Sendero devised a five-stage operational plan detailing the actions each regional 
committees must execute.  This five-stage operational template was designed to be 
executed by each region independently.  The stages were:
(1) agitation and armed propaganda, (2) opening campaign/sabotage against Peru's 
socioeconomic system, (3) the generalization of violence and the development of 
guerrilla war, (4) conquest and expansion of the movement's support base and the 
strengthening of the guerrilla army, and (5)  general civil war, the siege of the cities, and 
the final collapse of state power.72
Figure 1 displays the general relationships among these five stages and the three 
strategic phases of the revolution.  The operational stages are not necessarily  or directly 
correlated to the strategic phases.  The intent  of the strategic phases was to provide 
national direction; similarly the operational stages provided regional direction.  Each 
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Figure 1:  Sendero Ideological Flowchart.  Source:  Multiple Sources
region was expected to autonomously  execute revolutionary operations73; hence any 
given region could be ahead, behind, or alongside of other regions in the implementation 
of the operational stages.
Sendero had four primary types of tactical operations during the first two phases of 
revolution: terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla warfare and, after 1989, armed strikes.74   The 
first three tactics were planned for use as late as 1980; the last was added to SL’s doctrine 
in 1989.75  These tactics, as Sendero leaders doubtless learned during their training in 
Maoist China, focused the strength of the relatively  outnumbered and poorly equipped 
insurgency by attacking the enemy’s weakness.  Presumably  the people’s army would 
have had to use more conventional military tactics during the third phase — strategic 
offensive — in open combat with the remnants of the state security services.  In my 
research, however, I found no indication that Sendero put much thought into the tactical 
and operational requirements for the strategic offensive.  In the early days of the 
insurgency, Guzmán made exceedingly clear the institutional patience Sendero would 
display, particularly during the Strategic Defense.  Shining Path documents indicate a 
willingness to fight  a protracted people’s war that might continue for decades.76  It is 
possible that Sendero felt detailed planning for the Strategic Offensive in the early days 
of the insurgency was premature.  By  the time they neared that phase, as I explain in 
Chapter 3, their leadership  found planning difficult due to the pressure from state security 
services.
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The war between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state stretched into two 
decades and encompassed virtually the whole of Peru.  It would be impossible to provide 
any significant detail of the insurgency, and those particular events that are relevant to 
this discussion I examine in more detail in later chapters.
CONCLUSIONS
The historic fragmentation of the Peruvian left prevented any  unified effort to enact 
change, either legal or extra-legal, within Peru.  This disunity is evident in the 
disagreements of Mariátegui and Haya de la Torre, the countless fractures of leftist 
parties mid-century, the parallel revolutions of the 1960’s, and the disparate strategies of 
Sendero, MRTA, and the legal left in the 1980’s and ’90’s.  Peru’s insurgent leftists 
similarly  varied in their methods and tactics.  While the reasons for each of these 
variables is complex and varied, the result was a left unable to achieve consensus not 
only on how to change their nation, but also on the desired results.  These divisions did 
not prevent insurgencies from initiating or even realizing significant success, but they 
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CHAPTER III:  STRUCTURAL EFFECTS ON THE INSURGENCIES
Describing his feelings before embarking on what became the Cuban revolution, 
Che Guevara stated that “it was imperative to stop  crying and fight.”  While this 
exhortation might not have been directly heard in Peru in the 1960’s and 1980’s, the 
leftist protagonists in Peru during both eras clearly felt an impatience with the pace of 
revolutionary  progress and the perceived capitulation to the existing system by the legal 
left of their times.  Unfortunately for their causes, the leaders of the Peruvian 
insurgencies failed to realistically assess the then revolutionary  potential of Peru.  All of 
the groups ascribed to the Leninist view of the inevitability of revolution, and that 
leadership or action by the vanguard was a sufficient condition for its creation.1  
In the 1960‘s, Luís de la Puente and Hector Béjar, from the MIR and ELN 
respectively, were clearly inspired by the Cuban revolution; they  felt that Guevara’s foco 
theory  for success was as applicable to Peru as to Cuba.  In contrast, Sendero created 
much of their own revolutionary doctrine loosely  based on Marx, Lenin, and especially 
Mao, claiming that the “vanguard party,” would “lead the [peasant] masses across a ‘river 
of blood’” through revolution to the formation of a communist state.2   Less deliberate 
than their Maoist counterparts, Víctor Polay and MRTA claimed that the “Revolutionary 
Party” would be “created through action” from the “embryo” that was essentially   the 
vanguard.3  This “embryo” would form the nucleus for the spontaneous growth of support 
for its revolution, “the natural fusion of arms with the masses.”4   Thus with different 
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specifics, all the Peruvian insurgent groups arrived at similar positive conclusions 
regarding the appositeness of Peru for revolution.  Their faith in their specific form of 
Marxism complete, no group  considered whether the structural conditions for revolution 
truly existed in Peru.
The insurgents and their views of reality  significantly  misinterpreted the structural 
conditions of Peru in their respective time-periods.  In part, this failing had a common 
denominator among the groups.  All the revolutionaries traced their ideological roots in 
some form or fashion to José Carlos Mariátegui, who viewed the indigenous peasants as 
the true source of revolutionary  power.  His writings from the 1920’s cast Peru’s urban 
areas, especially Lima, as generally  insignificant in the socio-political makeup of the 
nation.  Some scholars have debated whether or not his theories were valid during his 
lifetime; it is clear that the political, social, and economic changes in Peru between the 
days of Mariátegui and the insurgencies of the late twentieth century  significantly eroded 
any applicability  of Mariátegui for the insurgents.  Yet De la Puente and the guerrillas of 
the 1960’s found a synergy between Mariátegui’s rural, peasant-based revolution and 
Guevara’s call for rural guerrilla warfare and the use of foco tactics.  
In the 1980‘s, Guzmán linked Mariátegui’s ideals to those of Mao in order to frame 
the party ideology and strategy  for Sendero Luminoso’s revolution in Peru.  Mao’s 
strategy of rural revolution neglected the importance of an intra-urban campaign. 
Guzmán’s goal was to carry  out  Mao’s revolution, tempered with Mariátegui’s Peruvian 
viewpoint, within his own country.  In contrast, MRTA was known for its urban flair — it 
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started and ended its revolutionary campaign with urban action.  Yet even MRTA viewed, 
at least ideologically, the rural portion of their insurgency as the “main stage” for 
revolution.5  However, the key  assumption made by  the revolutionaries — that  conditions 
in contemporary Peru were sufficiently similar to revolutionary  China or Cuba, or even to 
Mariátegui’s Peru — had no basis in reality.
In this chapter I analyze relevant structural conditions of Peru vis-à-vis the late 
twentieth-century  insurgencies, using Skocpol’s revolutionary  theory as the basis for my 
analysis.6  I divide the study into six sections.  In the first section I provide an overview 
of Skocpol’s revolutionary theory.  In the second section I examine the revolutionary 
leadership of the insurgencies.  In the third and fourth sections, I discuss the structure and 
relative stability  of the Peruvian state and armed forces respectively.  In the last two 
sections, I analyze the urban/rural divide in Peru during each revolutionary  period, then 
focus on the peculiarities inherent in the primacy of Peru’s capital city of Lima.
STRUCTURAL REVOLUTIONARY THEORY
The American abolitionist Wendell Phillips claimed that “revolutions are not made, 
they  come.”7  In this vein, Theda Skocpol — a leading scholar on revolutionary theory — 
rejects the idea that vanguards have “ever [created] the revolutionary crises [which] they 
exploited” to take power8.  Rather, she claims, successful revolutions took advantage of 
the existing structural state of affairs.  Thus, it  may be necessary for the peasantry  to be 
mobilized by the vanguard to create a social revolution, but  it is hardly  sufficient. 
Skocpol’s theory on social revolutions provides a structural basis by  which to examine 
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the relevant conditions in Peru during the respective revolutionary  periods of the four 
insurgencies.
Skocpol argues that independent structural factors greatly impact the viability of 
revolutions.  She posits that states in which social revolutions have been successful 
contained similar characteristics.  These states generally had agrarian societies with 
centralized “sanctioning machineries” and a socially independent peasantry.9  States that 
have realized successful social revolutions have all suffered under centralized, non-
representative governments in which the bureaucratic and military functions were in a 
pre-existing  state of collapse vis-à-vis the revolution.10  In addition to an extremely  weak 
or failing state, successful social revolutions consisted of an “organized revolutionary 
leadership” or “marginal elite political movements” that capitalized on widespread 
peasant uprisings.11  Contrary to traditional Marxist doctrine, the primary revolutionary 
conflict pitted peasants against a semi-feudalistic landholder  class, not the proletariat 
against the bourgeois.12   During the two Peruvian revolutionary periods detailed here, 
only some of Skocpol’s structural conditions are met; most key  structural elements 
required for social revolution were non-existent in late twentieth-century Peru.
LEADERSHIP OF THE MARGINAL ELITES
V. I. Lenin viewed the “vanguard of the proletariat” as those who are “capable of 
assuming power and of leading the whole people to socialism” (italics in the original).13 
Che Guevara added that the role of vanguard was not something to be arbitrarily 
assigned, but rather was earned by those “at the forefront of the working class through the 
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struggle for achieving power.”14  Yet Skocpol takes issue with the idea that revolutionary 
leadership stems from the masses.  Rather, she argues that the leadership of revolutionary 
movements must concern themselves with building an alternate state structure.  She does 
not exclude the definitions  of leadership presented by Lenin and Guevara; rather she 
constrains the field of potential candidates for successful leadership, perhaps in ways not 
intended by these men.  But Skocpol finds that successful revolutions have an organized 
leadership whose members come from the periphery of elite society and are educated in 
state-building.15
With few exceptions, the principal leadership  of the Peruvian insurgencies stemmed 
from the Skocpol definition of marginal elites.  Skocpol explains the term marginal elite 
as those “who were marginal by  virtue of social origins” or who “came from privileged 
social backgrounds [but] had been converted to radical politics during the course of” their 
“secondary or university education.”16   It  is ironic that organizations purportedly 
championing the rights of lower-class indigenous peasants and workers, as all four 
Peruvian insurgencies did in some form or fashion, would place so few of them in 
positions of influence.  Yet clearly the leadership of Peruvian insurgencies consistently 
displayed this marginal elite demographic.
In the 1960‘s, the leadership of the ELN and MIR were clear examples of marginal 
elites.  Luís de la Puente, the MIR chief, and his northern front leader, Gonzalo 
Fernández, were both lawyers.  Central front commander Guillermo Lobatón and ELN 
head Hector Béjar were both journalists.  The radicals under them were primarily a 
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collection of students, academics, lawyers, and full-time organizers and revolutionaries, 
with only a handful of blue-collar workers and even fewer peasants.17  The radicals of the 
1980’s were no less guided by marginal elites.  Guzman, of course, was a professor of 
philosophy at the University of Huamanga, and also had a degree in law.  Shining Path 
gained significant influence over many of Peru’s universities,18 and while the “typical 
militant is an eighteen-year-old Indian with only a grade-school education,” the “Sendero 
elite is very small and has a college education.”19  Starn contends that the characterization 
of Shining Path as “a ‘peasant rebellion’ or ‘agrarian revolt’” is completely unfounded; 
Sendero was a highly racist and classist organization where the poor indigenous peasants 
made up  the rank and file, commanded by  “a leadership composed mostly  of light-
skinned elites.”20   The group MRTA, which has ties to the MIR of 1965, and whose 
leadership “has ‘society’ connections,” is also  top-heavy with elites.21   The “marginal 
elite” pedigree of Peruvian insurgent leadership  is indisputable; their ability  to build 
alternate state structures is much more dubious.
The importance of the elite leadership was evident in all four insurgent groups; 
Sendero took this phenomena to an extreme.  An interesting facet of elite leadership, the 
potential for a personality cult, became evident by the rapid implosions of Sendero 
Luminoso after the capture of Abimael Guzmán in September 1992.  It is quite ironic that 
the idea of a cult of personality was condemned by Marx, realized in Stalin, and 
epitomized in Mao, with whom it  reached “a truly unheard-of magnitude in China.”22 
Perhaps it is not surprising that, as most scholars attest, Guzmán held almost absolute 
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sway over Sendero’s doctrine and actions.  There are numerous reports of dissent 
occurring within Sendero; virtually  all of these culminated with Guzmán declaring the 
official party line, followed by punishment in some form or fashion for the dissenters.23 
The “Cult of Guzmán,” as Guillermoprieto phrased it,24  created an almost god-like 
reverence for Gonzalo among his followers as they demanded “the peasantry  ‘submit’ not 
to God but to Presidente Gonzalo.”25  The Shining Path reverence to their leader was not 
so stark at the beginning of the war.  Early  on, Sendero militants would use phrases such 
as “Glory to Marxist  — Leninist — Mao Tse-tung thought! Long live the Communist 
Party of Peru!  Led by Comrade Gonzalo, we begin the armed struggle!”26   As his 
influence over his organization grew, Sendero began referring to Guzmán’s words as 
“Gonzalo Thought.”27  The religious overtones of Sendero’s reverence grew as well; soon 
party  couples began to marry “in the name of Chairman Gonzalo and the Communist 
Party of Peru.”28
Intolerant of dissent from the beginning, Guzmán’s stature virtually  shut down 
independent thought within the party.  Although the fanaticism of Sendero allowed the 
movement to weather the loss of key leaders such as occurred within the Metropolitan 
Committee in 1986, this absolute reliance on Guzmán became Sendero’s greatest 
weakness.  For some time before his capture, party adherents had begun using the slogan 
“Presidente Gonzalo: garantía de triunfo.”29   It is easy to understand, then, how his 
capture in September of 1992 dealt a devastating blow to the morale of the organization.
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A second aspect  of successful marginal elites, according to Skocpol, is the ability 
(or perceived ability) of these insurgent leaders to create a viable alternative to the 
existing state.  In order to succeed, the background and inclination of successful 
revolutionary  leadership historically  favored those adept at state-building and making 
“good their claims to state sovereignty” rather than “representatives of classes.”30  In this 
the Peruvian insurgent leadership had less than complete credibility.  It is true that all of 
the insurgent leaders were involved in political movements, be it within APRA, the PCP, 
or their various offshoots.  And all of the insurgent leaders were able to organize and 
form a group of adherents whom they were able to command in the performance of 
illegal acts — which as I demonstrate in Chapter 4, is more difficult than typically 
thought.  But organizing non-state political or military organizations is considerably 
different than managing state (or state-like) functions.  The dearth of state-building 
experience is clear among the Peruvian insurgent leadership.  With the exception of 
Abimael Guzmán and Sendero Luminoso, none of the insurgent groups ever showed any 
particular ability to effectuate the replacement of civil or state functions on a meaningful 
level. 
A final unfavorable indicator of potential revolutionary success for the Peruvian 
insurgencies was the lack of “organized revolutionary leaderships … from the marginal, 
educated elites” at “the fore” of the revolution.31   To be sure, within the individual 
insurgent organizations there was a general organizational unity among the leadership. 
This certainly  varied among the four groups.  The Shining Path remained united under 
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the absolute control of Abimael Guzmán.  Hinojosa describes this unique characteristic of 
Guzmán who, “even leaving aside his cult following … obtained an indisputable national 
presence that transcended party lines.”32  Polay’s MRTA, on the other hand, intentionally 
lacked both a clear ideology and a centralized party in order to maximize its base of 
appeal and support.  This created problems of unity within MRTA leadership, and 
significantly affected the insurgency’s ability to act collectively.33
Regardless of internal organizational unity, in Peru the insurgencies were also 
seriously damaged by  the fractures within the Peruvian left  that  directly impacted the 
attempted revolutions.  In addition to the general division among the left documented in 
Chapter 2, none of the insurgencies was able to win anything close to a general consensus 
of support by the left.  During the revolutions of 1965, for example, neither the MIR nor 
the ELN garnered any substantial extra-organizational support  from the left.  By 1963, 
the pro-Moscow PCP pursued “peaceful revolution from within the state rather than … 
armed rebellion.”34  Nonetheless, in June of 1965, the PCP indicated that it stood in 
solidarity with the armed insurgencies.  The leadership of the PCP quickly  realized, 
however, that retaliation by the Peruvian Armed Forces would be directed not only 
toward the guerrillas, but  toward the entire political left.  By August the PCP severely 
moderated its support for the insurgents by  stating that the insurgencies had 
misinterpreted the conditions in Peru, and that  a revolutionary situation did not yet exist. 
Issuing a statement, PCP leadership indicated moral support but formal disapproval of the 
armed uprisings, attempting to balance between appeasing the radicals within its ranks 
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and avoiding persecution by the armed forces.35  The Maoist Bandera Roja (forerunner of 
Sendero Luminoso) also failed to support the uprisings, but for different reasons.  The 
group issued a statement recognizing the attempted revolution and paying homage to De 
la Puente (who had been killed by the time the statement was made), but  also spelling out 
the ideological differences between the pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow (cum pro-Cuba) 
divisions within Peruvian Communism.  The ideological split was so severe that China 
instructed the Maoist groups to stay out of the fight.36 
Those same divisions manifested themselves during the insurgencies of the 1980’s. 
While the MIR and ELN were small enough that they  did not consider each other as 
rivals, Sendero and MRTA viewed each other as such, with the legal left vying for 
relevancy  as a third challenger.  While MRTA never came close to eclipsing the 
dominance of the Shining Path, Sendero felt threatened enough by  MRTA’s rising 
popularity in Lima that it changed its tactics in the city.  Direct  conflict  between Sendero 
and MRTA was also not uncommon; in some areas, such as the upper Huallaga valley, the 
two movements actually  fought each other.  Sendero refused to work with any other 
leftist groups, be they illegal or legal, referring to them as, among other things, 
“cretins.”37  From 1985 onward, the legal left was generally  unified under the Izquierda 
Unida party  framework.  Shining Path did not enter into the legitimate political process, 
but rather spent much of its energy  trying to disrupt elections.  When organizations and 
individuals from the left  attempted to oppose Sendero, the Shining Path “did not hesitate 
to use coercion, threats, and assassination.”38  By the early 1990’s, the legal left viewed 
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the Shining Path as a significant enough threat that it  began working with the Peruvian 
military towards Sendero’s defeat.39
The Peruvian insurgent movements of the 1960’s and 1980’s unquestionably 
included leadership by marginal elites.  The centrality of elite leadership was clear in all 
of the insurgencies, and was magnified in Guzmán’s cult of personality.  However, the 
marginal elites in the Peruvian insurgencies exhibited a general a lack of state-building 
experience and could not coalesce and solidify revolutionary  support from both the 
civilian populace nor the Peruvian left.  These deficiencies presented significant 
challenges to the insurgencies and call into question whether their organized marginal 
elite leadership was sufficient for its revolutionary role.
STATE STRUCTURE AND STABILITY IN “REVOLUTIONARY” PERU
It was not by  accident that Shining Path chose 1980 to begin its people’s war. 
During the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in March of 1980, Guzmán 
proclaimed Peru was in the midst of a “revolutionary situation” that  provided favorable 
conditions for the launch of armed conflict.40   The roots of this perception (and 
miscalculation) stem from numerous structural factors present at the time.  First, for the 
twelve years prior to 1980, Peru had been ruled by a military dictatorship.  Even prior to 
the military’s 1968 coup, the military had been an ever-present threat to democratically 
elected administrations.  Peru saw few transfers of power between two democratically 
elected presidents in the twentieth century; many elections had been interrupted by some 
form of military intervention.  For most of the remainder, the military’s silence was 
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nonetheless deafening.  Furthermore, Peru had a shallow history of municipal elections 
— the first national municipal elections were held in 1963, but the 1968 coup prevented 
further elections until November 1980.41   Twelve years of mismanagement by the 
military junta left Peru in the worst economic situation since World War II.42   A 
politically  dejected and subdued military prepared to relinquish power to the same 
democratically (re-)elected president  they had overthrown twelve years earlier.  Guzmán 
declared “the suffering of those from below from exploitation [is] tied to the inability of 
those from above to govern. … These two conditions exist … therefore” Peru is in “a 
revolutionary situation.”43
The writings by and literature on all four Peruvian insurgencies is littered with 
references to their perception of the potential “revolutionary situation” that each group 
believed existed in Peru upon the initiation of their revolution.  Lenin declared that “a 
revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation.”  He then provided three 
“leading signs” of the same:  a crisis of leadership or destabilization of political power, a 
significant increase in the misery  of the “exploited classes,” and an increasing 
restlessness in the masses.  Lenin cautioned that “not every revolutionary  situation leads 
to a revolution;” the ability of the “revolutionary  class to effect” revolution and 
overthrow the government was, in his opinion, the decisive factor.44   The Peruvian 
insurgents each thought that the time and place of their insurgency fit into their 
interpretation of a revolutionary situation.  However, the reality  was that state structural 
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stability, through the stabilizing factor of democracy, was increasing, not decreasing, at 
the initiation of each insurgency.
A great failure of the Peruvian insurgents in the twentieth century was their inability 
to understand the inherent  stability and durability of the Peruvian state and of its armed 
forces.  Skocpol characterizes a vulnerable state as one in which the government is non-
representative and both state and military are failing prior to a major revolutionary 
uprising.  By  all accounts, the Peruvian state in both 1965 and 1980 was both 
democratically representative and politically  strong.  The first condition, representation, 
was manifest in the popular democracy  of Peru.  While by no means a perfect system, 
Peru’s democratic process was generally fair, although repeated interventions by  the 
military cast doubts over the total freedom of the process.  Nonetheless, President 
Belaúnde enjoyed great popularity in the first few years of his presidency  (i.e. 
1963-1966), a fact that Béjar grudgingly acknowledges in his book.  Democracy was 
expanding in Peru, which saw its first national municipal elections in 1963.  
Not only was Peru a representative democracy, but the government of Peru was 
politically  strong during the 1960’s.45  Both the MIR and the ELN drew much of their 
revolutionary  inspiration from the example set by  Guevara and Castro in Cuba.  In his 
1964 speech declaring revolution, Luís de la Puente argued that the revolutionary 
conditions in Peru were equal or superior to those found in Cuba.46  It  is hard to imagine 
how De la Puente drew such a conclusion.  In the late 1950’s, Cuba was under the control 
of a dictator, President Fulgencio Batista.  He had taken power through a coup and his 
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regime was extremely  unpopular, especially in the year before its fall.  Batista became 
infamous for repressive policies; his unpopularity with the Cuban citizenry  and even his 
own army  gave the Cuban guerrillas a significant advantage.  Most Cubans at the time 
considered the Batista administration an illegitimate and unconstitutional regime.  In Peru 
under Belaúnde, by contrast, there was little protest  to the legitimacy of the government. 
Belaúnde’s initial reforms and populist platform gave him high popularity  until he 
encountered significant legislative setbacks in early 1966.  Despite the electoral 
interference exhibited by  the military in the 1962 and ’63 elections, even the opposition 
APRA party refused to make any negative claim regarding Belaúnde’s electoral victory.47 
Clearly Peru of 1964 was structurally dissimilar to revolutionary Cuba.
Superficially the conditions of Peru in 1980 may have appeared similar enough to 
the failing centralized state and collapsing military  establishment required in Skocpol’s 
revolutionary  theory.  But Peru was not on the brink of failure.  Despite its economic 
problems, the promise of democracy inspired hope in a large majority of Peruvians.  The 
Constitutional Assembly of 1978, and the presidential elections of 1980 both saw 
between 70 and 90% voter turnout,48 and Peruvian electoral participation in the 1980’s 
was among the highest in Latin America.49   As for the military, while it left power 
politically  embarrassed, it was still a viable fighting force in 1980.  Sendero’s assessment 
of the structure and stability  of the Peruvian government in 1980, then, was clearly off-
base.  
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In 1990, and after ten years of fighting the insurgencies of Sendero and MRTA, the 
Peruvian government and military were nearing what some observers believed would be 
a state of collapse.50  Peru’s economy at this time was one of the worst in the world, and 
the average citizen’s confidence in their government was abysmally low.51  Yet formal 
and informal political participation by the populace, especially the urban populace and 
even among the lower-classes, remained high,52  especially  during the 1990 elections. 
Equally significant, throughout the entire insurgency of Sendero Luminoso (even into the 
1990’s), the military never moved to seize power from the democratically elected 
governments despite intentional prodding by Sendero.53  It is clear that the the Shining 
Path and MRTA miscalculated the long-term staying power and legitimacy the electoral 
process imparted to the civilian government not only in the opening days of their 
campaigns, but also through three presidential administrations and a decade and a half of 
insurgency.  Representational democracy  proved to be highly resistant to revolutionary 
pressures despite political, economic, and military weakness.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Sendero and MRTA did not generate the 
popular uprising throughout the countryside they had predicted — and required.  Nor 
were their misguided strategic assumptions conducive to success in Lima.  Numerous 
surveys indicated a preference for democratically elected government in Lima. 
McClintock notes that this preference climbed from the already supermajority of 69% of 
respondents in 1982 to an incredible 88% in 1986.  As late as 1986, few respondents 
preferred either a return to military  dictatorship (3%) or a socialist revolution (6%).54 
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The insurgencies’ attempts at revolution not only pushed against the dictums of Skocpol’s 
prescription for revolutionary  success, but also alienated the urban populace whose 
support they desperately needed.
STABILITY OF THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES
Military capability  and stability is perhaps as crucial a factor in state stability as that 
of the political system itself.  This is especially  true in states such as Peru, where the 
military has had, at times, an explicit constitutional duty to “guarantee the Constitution 
and laws of the Republic and to maintain public order.”55  While this mandate from the 
1933 constitution was significantly  changed to limit  the military’s ability  to intercede 
extra-politically  in times of crisis, their role as protectors of the state from internal and 
external threats was generally accepted as fact.  The capabilities of the Peruvian armed 
forces in the 1960’s and 1980’s differed significantly, contributing to the swift defeat of 
the MIR and ELN and the partial success of Sendero Luminoso and MRTA. 
The insurgents of 1960‘s insisted on viewing the Peruvian structural situation 
through a Cuban lens.  In revolutionary  Cuba, Castro had created an extensive rural 
insurgent network two years prior to landing in the Granma.  The Cuban military, on the 
other hand, was undertrained, led by a highly  corrupt officer corps, and preferred to 
remain close to their barracks.  Once the campaign in the Sierra Maestra was underway, 
Castro’s guerrillas conducted the equivalent  of civic action programs among the 
peasantry, due in large part to Che Guevara.  The Cuban revolutionaries planted crops, 
constructed and operated factories, and even built a simple hydroelectric dam. 
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Furthermore, they provided law and order in the areas they  controlled.56  Quite a different 
situation existed in Peru.  While De la Puente’s MIR did attempt to create similar 
networks in the Peruvian highlands, they  did not put sufficient effort into the endeavor 
nor have much luck.57
Instead, in 1965, the organization most prepared for guerrilla warfare was the 
Peruvian military.  International observers proclaimed Peru’s military as one of the most 
capable in Latin America at  the time.58   They had one of the more highly developed 
officer education programs on the continent, and received significant Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) funds from the United States, second only  to Brazil.59   Throughout 
Peru’s history, its armed forces and military officers had a tendency to interfere with 
national politics.  In the 1950’s, the Army developed in its officer corps a very liberal 
view of military power — one that saw the military not only as the state protector from 
foreign and domestic threats, but also as an agent of development and modernization. 
Much of this liberalized attitude came from the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares 
(CAEM), an educational and professional development institute attended by senior 
military officers prior to their advancement to general officer.  Seventy percent  of 
CAEM’s 10-month curriculum consisted of non-military  topics ranging from social, 
political, and economic issues, with only 30 percent of the coursework involving military 
topics.  The CAEM  curricula linked national security with domestic social and economic 
development, and influenced multiple generations of Peruvian general officers from 1950 
onward.60
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The Peruvian officer corps did not limit its liberal ideas to the schoolhouse.  The 
Army in particular had daily  contact with the peasantry of the Andes not only in the form 
of the indigenous conscripts that populated the rank and file, but also with the 
communities adjacent  to remote military bases.  Unrest  in the 1950’s and the land 
invasions of the early 1960’s convinced Army leadership of the importance and necessity 
for military intervention into national development.  With the cooperation of their 
American advisors under the Alliance for Progress and MAP, the Peruvian Army 
developed and conducted numerous civic action programs.  Some of the progressive 
projects the military  undertook included literacy and vocational training for their 
indigenous conscripts, a floating medical clinic on the Amazon River, penetration roads 
and airstrips into the sierra by their Corps of Engineers, and assistance to locals with 
modernizing agricultural methods.  Through their brief term in control of the nation 
between 1962 and 1963, the military also became positively  associated with the popular 
social and economic policy of agrarian reform.61
The military did not only focus on civil assistance.  Alarmed by the revolution in 
Cuba and recognizing the growing threat  of insurgency  within their own country, the 
Peruvian Armed Forces trained in counterinsurgency  warfare.  Numerous Peruvian 
officers attended military schools in the United States, including the Army Special Forces 
school at Fort Bragg, NC.  The CIA even brought Special Forces trainers to Peru and 
created a counterinsurgency school in the jungle.  Beyond tactics, senior military officers 
wrote Peruvian counterinsurgency  doctrine which they taught to their officers. 
60
Operationally, the military created an extensive intelligence network in the Peruvian 
sierra, using their FBI and CIA-trained agents to monitor and track MIR and ELN 
guerrillas in the years and months before the insurgency.  By the time the two revolutions 
appeared in 1965, the Peruvian military was as ready as any in Latin America to deal with 
the situation.62  
A lot can change in a decade and a half.  While the Peruvian military  of the 1960’s 
enjoyed training and equipment from the United States, this relationship was cut during 
the military  junta of the 1970’s.63  Peru’s once-vaunted  military slowly withered.  The 
1980’s found the armed forces at  odds with, and mired in, the political system. 
Unprepared for the forcefulness of the insurgencies of Sendero and MRTA, they  lacked 
counterinsurgency training, equipment, and, significantly, a coherent strategy to counter 
the threat.  While still fairly  powerful militarily  at the beginning of the 1980’s, as the 
decade progressed, Peru’s economic and political troubles eroded much of the military’s 
power.
The armed forces began the decade with a retreat from politics, handing over 
control of the nation to elected civil authorities after twelve years of rule.  The  military’s 
disappointing performance was a harsh dose of reality for the idealistic officers who so 
optimistically took charge in 1968.  The failure of so many of their progressive policies, 
coupled with the resurgence of left-wing insurgencies in Shining Path and MRTA, created 
a rightward shift  in the ideologies of the military.  One of the effects of this rightward 
shift was a renewed distrust of the left by  the military. This became especially true of 
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military sentiment towards APRA and President García after the 1985 election, and this 
sentiment was reciprocated by Apristas, further fueling the flames.64   The García and 
Fujimori years were populated with rumors of military coups, prosecutions of military 
officers for coup conspiracies, and concern by the people that the military would once 
again try  to take charge of the nation,65 despite President García’s attempt to enlist the 
support of the armed forces.  His success at engaging the military leaders was looked 
upon unfavorably by  junior officers; the rivalry between the military and APRA was 
resurrected within the ranks.66
But tensions between the military and the civilian government were not limited to 
the García administration.  From the beginning, the Belaúnde administration was 
naturally  wary of the armed force, not just out of historical animosity but also from a 
distaste for the military’s style of politics.67   The administration also harbored some 
distrust of the military  concerning Sendero’s insurgency.  After all, the military knew 
about Sendero’s preparations for revolution prior to turning over power, but took no 
action to intercept the group when they  were more vulnerable.68   Upon leaving the 
presidency, the military  administration reportedly took all of their intelligence files with 
them, leaving the Belaúnde administration with nothing to build on.69  Belaúnde’s distrust 
resulted in the president refusing to allow the armed forces to play any counterinsurgency 
role against  Sendero’s insurgency until December 1982, and in his diminishing the 
capabilities of the armed forces’ intelligence service.70  
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National political involvement did more harm than good for the armed forces; poor 
diplomatic relations with the U.S. also impeded their development.  In the early days of 
the junta, the military leaders asked to purchase arms from the U.S., which declined the 
request.  With French and Israeli equipment too expensive for Peru’s budget, the Soviets 
were the only major power with both reasonably priced equipment and a willingness to 
deal with Peru. The junta established ties with, and received training and equipment 
from, the Soviet Union.71  There is rich irony in this relationship, given Soviet  support for 
the insurgencies of 1965.  Nevertheless, from a military  perspective, the combination of a 
third (after the French and American) set of training and equipment imposed more 
doctrinal and logistical confusion on the armed forces.72   This relationship with the 
Soviets lasted well into the 1980’s, as did the Peruvian propensity  for purchasing military 
equipment from various sources, especially  France.73  Fifteen years later, Belaúnde faced 
similar stonewalling from Washington, forcing him to purchase equipment from France.74 
This soured relations between the two countries and limited Peru’s ability to import 
counterinsurgency training and equipment for its armed forces.  The U.S. became 
concerned over the growing Peruvian insurgent threat in the mid-1980’s and offered help 
multiple times, but was declined by the García administration.  Not until Fujimori took 
office did U.S. support for Peruvian counterinsurgency reach noticeable levels.
The Peruvian armed forces in the early  1908‘s received equipment and were 
sufficiently funded as evidenced by  the Belaúnde administration’s purchase of French 
Mirage fighter aircraft, Soviet Hind helicopters, numerous automatic rifles and night 
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vision equipment, and other acquisitions.75 But apart from this material support, what the 
Peruvian military needed was counterinsurgency strategy.  The Sinchis, for example, 
were a Peruvian counterinsurgency police unit who had received training from U.S. 
Special Forces in the 1960’s — training that was directed at countering a Cuban-style 
guerrilla warfare model.  After the severing of U.S.-Peruvian military  training, the 
Sinchis continued to propagate, and distort, the training they  had received.  In the early 
1980’s they were deployed against Sendero Luminoso, and eagerly and aggressively 
employed their outdated and distorted version of counterinsurgency on the populace of 
Ayacucho.  While they had little effect against the insurgency, they earned quite a 
reputation among the local populace by their brutality.76  The army fared no better.  Stuck 
with stagnant U.S. tactics from the 1960’s77  (which the Americans had long since 
abandoned), they  turned to another source of tactical knowledge in an attempt to find a 
solution to their insurgency problem.
While it is debatable whether the U.S. in the early 1980’s had such a highly 
successful strategy, U.S. military advisors doubtless could have provided better options 
than those Soviet-inspired tactucs used by  the Peruvian military  early in the 1980’s. 
Gorriti claims that despite Shining Path accusations of heavy Soviet support for Peru’s 
military, the training and equipping of Peruvian military and police “did not produce a 
single change in the war’s course.”78  In terms of positive change, this is probably true. 
But unlike their American counterparts who were analyzing lessons learned from a 
mixed-success (militarily) counterinsurgency experience in Vietnam, in the early 1980‘s 
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the Soviets were embroiled in their own third-world unconventional war in Afghanistan. 
There are significant similarities between the Soviet and Peruvian approach to 
counterinsurgency in the early years of both conflicts.  The Soviet counterinsurgency 
strategy in Afghanistan was based upon “intimidation and genocide, reprisals, subversion, 
and military  forays.”79   The Peruvian Army clearly used two of the three — the 
diminished capacity  of military intelligence services described previously hampered their 
effectiveness until the early 1990’s.
Peru did not have a counterinsurgency strategy for much of the 1980’s.  The 
Belaúnde administration, unprepared for the large-scale threat posed by Sendero, initial 
gave the military  almost unlimited latitude in its counterinsurgency operations.80   The 
armed forces, also without a cohesive strategy and doctrine, appears to have allowed its 
regional commanders to devise their own methods.  These methods often took on a 
decidedly  Soviet-esque flavor in their harshness, but the administration overlooked the 
growing number of human rights abuses.  While Sendero used targeted violence, 
especially in the first few years of their insurgency, the military applied a “color-blind” 
approach, associating indigenous heritage with insurgent sympathies: “when they saw 
dark skin, they fired.”81  Ironically, when some military  leaders tried to implement civic-
action style tactics and move away  from heavy-handed repression, the Belaúnde 
administration stifled these efforts.82   The heavy-handedness continued into the García 
administration with, it appears, some encouragement from the president himself.  A 1986 
Lima prison riot caused a nationwide scandal and resulted in the trial and punishment of 
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several military leaders; the military spread word after the incident that the President 
gave the order to kill the prisoners.83  The military’s tactics between 1983 and 1985 were 
so harsh they  frequently  caused more devastation than those of Sendero during the same 
timeframe; not until the late 1980’s did the military move away from genocidal  and 
repressive tactics.84  
The Peruvian military was woefully unprepared for the insurgencies at the 
beginning of the 1980’s, but it was still a viable fighting force which Sendero did not dare 
confront openly.  In 1980, Peru had the third largest army on the continent, with the 
second highest number of soldiers per capita.85  The Belaúnde administration, perhaps in 
an effort to appease the military, purchased the significant amounts of arms and 
equipment mentioned previously.  Despite the use of heavy-handed tactics that caused 
undesired secondary effects, the military campaigns of 1983-1984 significantly weakened 
Sendero’s operational abilities.86   By  1990, however, much of this military  power had 
eroded.  The military faced declining budgets, limited supplies, and declining salaries, all 
of which precipitated a sharp drop  in morale.87   Corruption was rampant within the 
officer corps; leaders were often paid by  drug traffickers to “not see” activity near their 
bases.88  The situation became so bad that by  1989 the commander of the Peruvian Navy 
made the mere survival of the institution the mission for that year.89  These weaknesses 
were compensated, at least partially, by the García and Fujimori administrations in other 
areas.  In the darkest days for the military, the civilian government leveraged other state 
intelligence services, particularly the national intelligence service (Servicio de 
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Inteligencia Nacional or SIN), and garnered external support from the CIA.90 
Additionally, the government enabled the self-defense committees, empowering the 
peasantry and encouraging a grass-roots counter-revolution against Sendero.  Finally, 
under the direction of Vladimir Montesinos, the Peruvian military  began to improve their 
counterinsurgency operations.91
Structurally, the Peruvian Armed Forces never reached the extent of organizational 
failure required for state collapse.  The military remained powerful through most of 
Peru’s two periods of insurgency. While undoubtedly  military power dipped significantly 
by the early 1990’s, it  was still a functional organization whose failings were, in some 
ways, compensated by other elements of Peruvian state services.
THE URBAN/RURAL DIVIDE
One of the ideas common to all of the Peruvian insurgent groups was the primacy of 
revolution through the peasantry, stemming from the ideologies of Mariátegui, Guevara, 
and Mao.  The idea of agrarian-based revolution in Peru fits well with Skocpol’s 
observation that successful revolutions pit  peasants against semi-feudalistic landholders. 
In both the 1960‘s and 1980‘s, Peruvian insurgents claimed that their nation remained a 
“semi-feudal” country and promoted “agrarian revolution.”92   Sendero, in particular, 
continued to claim that Peru was a semi-feudal state well throughout the 1980’s.  Guzmán 
claimed that Peru’s peasantry composed over sixty percent of the population93; this figure 
may have been accurate as late as 1940, closer to the time of Mariátegui, but was 
certainly not true for the 1980’s.94  The assumption that Peru was an agrarian state during 
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the revolutionary periods was clearly  inaccurate both in economic and demographic 
terms. 
Economically, Peru was not primarily an agrarian society in 1965, nor in 1980. 
Figures for 1961 show that the non-agricultural sectors (including manufacturing, 
government, and white-collar) accounted for over 52% of the labor force;95 by 1965, non-
agricultural sectors accounted for 77.5% of the GDP.96  Peru’s economy centered around 
its petroleum, fishing, and mining industries, and had, according to a 1959 UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America report, one of the most diverse range of exports in the 
world.97   By 1965, there were few semi-feudalistic landholdings remaining in the 
Peruvian sierra; rather, corporate-owned landholdings and communal or individual farms 
had largely replaced the traditional latifundios.98   The former did not facilitate 
radicalization in the manner of semi-feudal landholdings (I discuss this further in Chapter 
4); the latter, of course, provides few similarities to a semi-feudalistic system.99  These 
economic trends away from an agrarian economy continued throughout the 1960’s and 
1970’s.  In 1965, Peru’s economy had relatively recently  ceased to be agrarian, and thus 
one might excuse the miscalculations of De la Puente and Béjar.  By  1980, only strong 
ideological blinders could have allowed Guzmán and Polay to argue the case of an 
agrarian state.
Demographically, Peru was a rapidly  urbanizing country.  By extrapolating data 
from the 1961 and 1972 censuses, it appears that in 1965, just over half the population of 
Peru lived in cities, with forty  percent of all urban Peruvians living in Lima.  This gave 
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Lima twenty-one percent of the entire population of the country.100  In the 1960’s, many 
peasants were migrating to the cities, causing the rural population to stagnate even as the 
urban population grew rapidly.  Interestingly, even as Béjar and De la Puente tacitly 
acknowledged a role for urban areas in their revolutions, they did not initially  place any 
significance on the exploitation of the cities for anything more than moral and financial 
support.  Some insurgent groups (whose ties to the MIR and ELN were vague) attempted 
to conduct revolutionary  activities in Lima and other cities during the 1965 guerrilla 
campaign; the Peruvian authorities quickly and easily dispatched these groups. 
Generally, the MIR and ELN viewed the cities in the Guevara model, as something to be 
addressed in the later stages of the insurgency once the guerrillas grew large enough to 
deal with them.  However, during the Cuban revolution, urban insurgency played a much 
more crucial role than Guevara admitted to in Guerrilla Warfare.101  
Unlike Peru, Cuba in the late 1950’s was an agrarian society; sugar cane cultivation 
dominated the economy.  And yet despite the higher importance of agriculture and 
peasantry in Cuba, the success of the Castro’s revolution relied heavily on the urban 
underground revolutionary  movement.  First, urban areas provided an estimated sixty to 
eighty percent of guerrilla fighters for the revolution, many of whom the urban 
underground recruited.  The underground also provided crucial supplies, weapons, 
finances, and information for the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra.  Second, the urban 
guerrilla movement carried out numerous actions against the Batista regime, and 
sustained the preponderance of casualties during the war.  Finally, the urban movement 
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provided key manpower and support for the Castro’s guerrillas during the final collapse 
of the Batista regime.  The Peruvian guerrillas, on the other hand, never established a 
functional communication network with their backers in Lima and other urban centers. 
This was due in part to their poor planning, in part to the ideological blinders of the 
insurgents, and in part to the much harsher topography and daunting distances which 
differentiate the Peruvian highlands from the Cuban Sierra Maestra.  Once the conflict 
started, the Peruvian Army surrounded the guerrillas, cutting off any support they had 
hoped to receive.  Furthermore, the police were able to disable and disrupt the Peruvian 
insurgencies’ meager support networks within the cities.102  It is difficult to imagine how 
a revolution in an urbanized, non-agrarian society such as Peru could succeed without a 
strong urban component.  The myth of rural insurgency through focos propagated by 
Guevara could not overcome the significant urban challenges of Peru in 1965 in the 
absence of a coherent urban strategy.
Peru in 1980 also bore little resemblance to the semi-feudal state envisioned by 
Guzmán.  At the start  of Sendero’s lucha armada, Peru’s peasantry did not resemble the 
restless agrarian mass of revolutionary China.  The military  junta in 1968 had undertaken 
an ambitious agricultural reform program that, while only  partially successful, had 
unequivocally changed the landscape of the Peruvian countryside and essentially 
eliminated whatever vestiges of feudalism may have remained until their regime.103  The 
majority  of Peru’s population — about sixty-five percent in 1981104 — lived in Lima and 
other urban centers.  What remained in the rural highlands consisted of “medium scale 
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farmers ... comparatively well-to-do kaiaks,105 [and] vast  numbers of semi-proletarianized 
minifundists” that dominated the economic landscape; “‘feudal’ landlords [were] 
conspicuous by their absence.”106  While the idea of agrarian revolution may have neatly 
fit into the insurgent ideologies, Peru’s revolutionaries mistakenly  placed their hopes on a 
peasantry that was not as large, socioeconomically significant, nor oppressed as those in 
countries that experienced successful revolutions.  The greater challenge for the 
insurgents of the 1980’s was not just the issue of urban revolution, but that of revolution 
within the unusually dense primate city of Lima.
THE PRIMACY OF LIMA
Skocpol’s structural analysis focuses on the correlation between a structurally 
agrarian society and social revolution.  She does not address the effects of urbanization, 
nor examine the issue of a primate urban area.  However, it  is worth studying the 
structural effects of urbanization, particularly  of the primate urban area of Lima as it 
relates to Sendero Luminoso’s urban campaign.  As I mentioned in the previous section, 
the myth of the semi-feudal agrarian society bore no relation to the reality of the Peruvian 
situation during the Shining Path’s revolution.  In 1980, Lima was no longer the 
backwater capital of an agrarian state described by Mariátegui — it was a huge, and 
growing, primate city.  According to Dietz, Lima grew from 591,000 in 1941 to 4.6 
million in 1981, to over 6.5 million in 1993 and had a primacy index of 4.03:1.107  Thus 
Lima’s very size in 1981 defied any notion that Peru was an agrarian society.  A student 
of the Mao’s revolution, Guzmán should have easily  understood the differences in 
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urbanization levels between modern Peru and both revolutionary  China and pre-
urbanized Peru.  In 1952, just  after the end of their civil war, the urban population of 
China was a mere 12.5% of the total populace108; the Lima of Mariátegui’s day consisted 
of less than 10% of the total population of Peru.  In 1981, Lima alone accounted for 27% 
of Peru’s total population — 29% by 1993 — and over 40% of the nation’s urban 
population.109   Such a large disconnect between Guzmán’s perception of total 
urbanization — 40%110 — and the reality — 65-70% with almost 30% in Lima alone111 
— foreshadowed the significant difficulties that Sendero experienced in their campaign 
for Lima throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.  These difficulties were manifested in both 
structural and social terms.  In this section I discuss the structural issues; in the next 
chapter I address the socio-political issues affiliated with urbanization.
Louis Wirth discusses the structural effect urbanization has on social structures.  In 
his seminal piece on “Urbanization as a Way  of Life,” Wirth proposes that the urban 
setting affects individuals and groups significantly.  He observes that city dwellers 
interact in “highly segmental roles” and “are associated with a greater number” of groups. 
This dynamic, Wirth claims, makes it difficult for any one group to dominate the 
attention of the individual.112   Peru’s capital of Lima is the most densely populated 
primate city  in the Americas.113  Not only is it the largest city in Peru, but as the capital, it 
also serves as the hub for all police and military activities.  Its political importance, size, 
and density presented many difficulties for Sendero’s Metropolitan Committee of Lima.
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While Sendero Luminoso is generally thought of, and preferred to be known, as a 
rural insurgency, by necessity it  conducted extensive urban operations, especially  in 
Lima.  To its credit, Shining Path appeared to grasp the importance of urban operations 
early in their campaign, and established a headquarters to control operations in Lima 
designated the Metropolitan Committee.  Though urban operations were a part of 
Sendero’s strategy from the outset, Shining Path “never ceased [to perceive the 
countryside] as the arena for the strategic accumulation of forces and the [revolution’s] 
final resolution.”114  In 1980, members of the Central Committee became concerned that 
the supposed heresy  of Albania’s communist  leader Enver Hoxha — that of emphasizing 
urban over rural operations — had infiltrated party strategy.  While the exact nature of 
internal conflict is not clear, Guzmán apparently did feel that cities are a “necessary 
compliment” to actions in the countryside — a tempering of orthodox Maoism.115 
Nonetheless, this conflict led to a curtailment of Shining Path operations in Lima in the 
early 1980’s.116   The effect of this curtailment put Metropolitan Committee operations 
behind their rural counterparts.  It is questionable whether Sendero truly understood the 
importance of urban operations; more evident is that Shining Path’s Maoist ideology of 
rural revolution interfered with their willingness to resource an urban campaign. 
Sendero’s Central Committee adopted a cellular structure in their organization, an 
idea seen in other Latin American insurgencies.  This initially translated well to urban 
operations; in Lima the Metropolitan Committee controlled all Shining Path urban 
operations.  In addition to the standard revolutionary actions that all regional committees 
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supervised, the Metropolitan Committee controlled an additional set of “special squads” 
that conducted specific operations.117   The Metropolitan Committee also had 
responsibilities for intelligence gathering, the protection of party  leaders and structure, 
and carrying out sanctions against traitors.118   Because of the cellular structure and 
tactical decentralization, operations within Lima (as in the rest of the country) were run 
Figure 2:  Sendero Luminoso Organizational Chart
(Source:  Palmer, The Revolutionary Terrorism, 1990, p. 29)
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independently; while there was some coordination between cells, sectors, zones, or even 
regions, Sendero relied upon its decentralized structure to both make attacks harder to 
prevent and the organization much more difficult  to disrupt. 119   This cellular structure 
worked well to counter the significant presence of state security services within Lima.  
Like many  third-world countries with primate cities, Peru’s government was much 
more attentive both to the large voting constituency within Lima and to the literal and 
symbolic importance of security within Lima to the political and economic stability of the 
nation.  Thus, insurgent activities in Lima created a much greater sense of concern and 
urgency on the part of both the citizenry and the government than Sendero actions in the 
sparsely-populated highlands.  And while the state security  services did not have the 
capability to respond to Sendero Luminoso in every remote corner of Peru, they were 
always capable of massing forces in and around the capital.  In part, this meant that 
agents of the state could move virtually unhindered and in the open, while Sendero’s 
operatives had to always work clandestinely.  Cell members rarely  knew other Sendero 
members outside of their immediate cell.120  Members only  knew each other by an alias 
(rosters with true identities were kept at the regional level).121  In this way, no amount of 
coercion by  state security services could convince a member to divulge what he or she 
did not know and expose large numbers of other members.  However, as McCormick 
notes, the requirement for clandestine operations within the city  stifles efficient  and 
interactive communication.122  
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The requirement for decentralized operations limited Sendero’s possibilities for 
unified effort and effective coordination.123  Other problems were also brought about by 
the density  and heterogeneity described by Wirth.  The urban migrant communities had a 
low probability for radicalization using Handelman’s analysis of peasant communities. 
He found that radicalization had more to do with the intrinsic condition of the populace 
than any action taken by an external revolutionary group,124  and that radicalization 
increases linearly with solidarity  and inversely with social development.  In Lima the 
migrant communities had just the opposite characteristics:  they were socially developed 
and, according to Dietz, the perceived neighborhood solidarity in the 1980’s and 90’s was 
low, dropping to less than 25% in 1990.125  The high social development combined with 
low unity fit Handelman’s model of a populace with low probability of radicalization.
In the countryside, Sendero controlled the populace through fear, intimidation, and 
the imposition of a strict  social order.  It tried to do the same among Limeños; however, 
“urban residents,” says McCormick, “simply have more avenues of legitimate political 
expression available to them.”126  The social issues surrounding democracy that I discuss 
in the next chapter are magnified by the structural issues of urbanization, putting Wirth’s 
theory  to reality: urban organizations cannot easily dominate the total attention of the 
urban individual.  Tactically, Sendero constructed a well-conceived urban campaign that 
could survive and operate fairly well within the constraints of the dense metropolis of 
Lima.  Operationally and strategically, however, the campaign in Lima provided 
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underwhelming results because of the very constraints it had neutralized tactically.  These 
constraints may well have been the downfall  of Sendero as a whole.
In some ways, Sendero was a victim of its own success, especially in Lima.  The 
relatively rapid progression of Sendero’s revolution appears to have begun outpacing the 
strategic and operational-level planning abilities of Shining Path leadership.  Despite 
Sendero’s projection of confidence and tactical success in Lima, the security of its senior 
leaders became increasingly more difficult as state security  services stepped up  their 
pressure on those elements of Sendero in Lima.  In the years before his 1992 arrest, 
Guzmán constantly  had to move among safe houses as the state security  services 
narrowly missed capturing him on multiple occasions.127  By  the time they proclaimed 
the advent of a “Strategic Equilibrium”, the Shining Path leadership were living in an 
environment quite unfavorable to deliberate strategic and operational planning.  The 
general lack of planning and doctrine in the later stages of their revolution are indicators 
of the organizational difficulties Sendero faced in their last chaotic months of dominance.  
This highlights another problem for Sendero in Lima.  The population density of the 
city created what J. Bowyer Bell termed “guerrilla overload”: as an insurgent 
organization strengthens numerically, it reaches a saturation point whereby the loss of 
members is accelerated both from an increase in the number of members captured and a 
correlating increase in the number of new, and therefore inexperienced and vulnerable, 
members in the organization.128  This limited Sendero’s ability  to assert its influence and 
move as rapidly  as it wanted to within the city.  The pressure by the state on Sendero 
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within Lima created debilitating effects beyond merely diminishing the effectiveness of 
its leaders.  The movement of leadership into the city weakened the operational security 
of the organization as a whole.  Police raids in 1990 and 1991 yeilded significant seizures 
of plans, schedules, and records that permitted state security services an ever-increasing 
series of successes in breaking apart Sendero.129   The capture of key leaders and 
actionable intelligence finally resulted, in September of 1992, in the capture of Guzmán 
by the Peruvian Anti-Terrorism Police.  In the face of an increasingly effective 
counterinsurgency campaign, the loss of Guzmán’s leadership was more than Sendero 
could bear.  In the months and years following Guzmán’s capture, Sendero began to 
rapidly break apart as much from capitulation and desertion as from direct state 
intervention.
CONCLUSIONS
Peru was not structurally  primed for revolution in 1965, nor in 1980.  The marginal 
elites were present and ready to lead an insurrection, though their credentials and disunity 
made them poor candidates for revolutionary leadership.  The state and military structures 
were neither weak nor failing.  The state government in power was elected by  generally 
free elections, something even Che understood as a major impediment to armed 
revolution.130  While the economy of the sierra region was agrarian, Peru as a nation did 
not have a predominately agrarian economy.  The country  was also experiencing large-
scale rural to urban migrations, especially to Lima.  Not only did any actions by the rural 
peasantry have ever diminishing economic influence within Peru, but also that their 
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sociopolitical influence as a rural mass, borne by the strength of their numbers, decreased 
proportionally  as well.  The urbanization effect, particularly in Lima, created even more 
difficulties for the insurgents of the 1980’s and hampered their attempts at popular 
mobilization.  
The leaders of the Peruvian insurgencies argued that the conditions for revolution 
were ripe in 1965 and 1980.  Clearly an unbiased evaluation of the structural conditions 
of Peru was not  a part of their analysis.  But while structural effects account for the 
stability  of the state, but they do not explain why the peasantry or proletariat failed to 
become radicalized or mobilize.  To answer this question, I will analyze the sociopolitical 
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CHAPTER IV:  SOCIOPOLITICAL EFFECTS ON THE INSURGENCIES
Samuel Huntington once predicted that  “at some point, the slums of Rio and 
Lima ... like those of Harlem and Watts, are likely  to be swept by social violence, as the 
children of the city demand the rewards of the city.”1   The idea of the impending 
radicalization of the proletariat meshes well with Marx’s idea that the “proletariat alone is 
a revolutionary class … special and essential” in the industrial age.2   Over forty years 
later, Huntington’s 1968 prediction has yet  to materialize in any meaningful way Latin 
America.  By many indications, the urban poor, while not necessarily  content with their 
situation, are by no means the “tinder for Castro’s match.”3   To the contrary, the 
sociopolitical challenges presented the insurgent in both rural and urban operations are 
quite daunting, as the insurgencies in Peru have revealed.  
Four insurgencies in two time periods over approximately fifteen years (of armed 
insurrection) produced at  best a mediocre showing of popular mobilization.  Though their 
ultimate goals and objectives differed slightly, the doctrine of each group  centered on the 
idea that social revolution requires class-based mobilization and revolt.  Each attempted, 
in its own way, to radicalize the Peruvian populace, believing this was necessary to 
achieve popular mobilization.  Portes provides a useful definition of radicalization as the 
“active participation or sympathy for revolutionary movements committed to a total and 
rapid transformation of the existing societal structure.”4  Each group believed that their 
revolutionary  movement, be it centered on foco theory, the “party,” or even 
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“revolutionary example,”5 would spark this radicalization, leading to widespread uprising 
within a peasantry  already on the verge of rebellion.  Once the peasantry began to revolt, 
so too, they thought, would the urban proletariat.  At times, the insurgencies were able to 
successfully  conduct attacks on government, civil, and military  targets; in the 1980’s, 
Sendero, and to a much more limited extent MRTA, gained enough power they  could 
even act with a degree of impunity  in some areas of Peru.  But none of these groups 
realized any significant level of behavioral radicalization, nor did they attract a 
significant popular following or inspire the popular uprisings requisite for their 
revolutions to succeed.
The Peruvian insurgents made broad and idealistic assumptions regarding the 
favorability of the socio-political conditions that existed in Peru.  In reality, these 
conditions were significantly weighted against the desired outcomes of the revolutions. 
The research and theories on peasant and proletariat radicalization and mobilization have 
some common themes.  First, poor communities tend to be most vulnerable to 
radicalization and mobilization when they  have a strong perception of alienation from the 
political process.  This frequently  occurs in rural communities transitioning from a 
traditional (and hence isolated) to a modern social system, and in communities that 
receive a significant amount of radical political indoctrination.  Next, poor communities 
and the individuals within them generally  act in their perceived self-interest; extra-legal 
activity is seen as a last resort and is not commonly synonymous with anti-state or 
revolutionary  intent.  This self-interest leads to a natural inclination toward stability and a 
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general aversion for activities that might create major sociopolitical disruption.  Finally, 
poor communities possess a desire for self-determination, especially  through the 
democratic process.  These characteristics are not limited to poor communities or 
citizens, but research into mobilization and radicalization generally  focuses on those who 
have been the focus of insurgents and revolutionaries throughout history.  If “the strength 
of a democracy is … in the people,”6 then the ability of a nation to resist  insurgency must 
certainly be intertwined with the will of its individual citizens.
PEASANT AND PROLETARIAT MOBILIZATION THEORIES
Howard Handelman’s study of peasant communities in the Peruvian highlands 
provides a “three-stage model of modernization and development” in the highlands, 
consisting of traditional, transitional, and integrated communities.7  The probability of 
radical mobilization in a village bears a curvilinear relationship to the transitional state of 
the community.8   In other words, both traditional and integrated communities have 
generally  low probabilities of 
mobilization, while the probability 
for transitional communities is 
relatively higher (see Figure 3).  In 
peasant communities, Handelman 
found that a high probability of 
radicalization was correlated with both advanced social development (such as education, 
social mobility, and contact with the outside world), and high levels of internal solidarity 
Figure 3:  Modernization and Mobilization
in Peasant Communities
(Source: Handelman, Struggle in the Andes, 192)
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within a community.  He refined this assessment by noting that even among transitional 
communities with both high levels of social development and solidarity, radicalization 
required a high perception of political alienation and perceived class conflict.  This 
specific combination presented itself only in those regions such as Cuzco, Ayacucho, and 
Huancavelica, composed of primarily  semi-feudal haciendas.  In regions such as Junín 
and Pasco, located north of the Huancavelica region, the latifundios generally  were 
corporate-owned, their employees were treated better than the workers on traditional 
latifundios, and the corporations did not  dominate nearby towns.  And while the Peruvian 
insurgents generally viewed radicalization as a necessary  step towards mobilization, 
Handelman concluded that those who mobilized were not always radicalized.  He found 
that mobilized peasants often did not  share the same goals as the leftists who organized 
them.  In many instances, the peasants who conducted land invasions did not want 
independence and revolution, merely land.  The peasants would march “onto the land, 
carrying their ancient land titles and the Peruvian flag” — hardly an image revolutionary 
fervor.9
The peasantry of the Peruvian highlands was not an undifferentiated mass, nor was 
it unified.  Handelman records differences between the small, predominately  peasant 
landholdings of the northern sierra, the corporate landholdings of parts of the central 
sierra and the Peruvian coast, and the prevalent semi-feudal landholdings of the south-
central sierra.  In the instance of the northern highlands, the diversity created by small 
farms and multiple landholders created the secondary effect of a local capitalist economy 
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that provided opportunities for merit-based individual advancement.  The corporate 
landholdings, while similar in some ways to the large olicarchy-owned haciendas, tended 
to pay  their employees well, dampening resentment among the local populace.  In areas 
with many non-corporate haciendas, as Tom Brass notes, there were still significant 
socioeconomic strata within the peasantry.  The socioeconomic ladder ran from the  rich 
peasant landholder and wealthy peasant tenants (who sub-let their land to others) at the 
top to landless laborers at the bottom, with poor tenants and sub-tenants making up the 
center.  Hugo Blanco’s FIR movement, for example, targeted the wealthier peasantry. 
Ironically, Blanco’s mobilizations and land invasions created a dual power structure that 
naturally  favored the wealthier peasantry.  It  was the poorer peasants who first requested 
intervention by the state against the FIR and rich peasants — clearly the opposite of the 
Peruvian left’s vision of peasant-based mobilization.10
Research on the urban poor in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America shows similar 
trends.  Many  of the urban poor in Lima during 1964 were migrants from the sierra who 
lived in squatter settlements; many of these settlements were formed through illegal land 
invasions.  In Handelman’s study of squatter settlements in Santiago de Chile, he found 
that squatter mobilization centered around issues with direct impact on the community 
and quality of life.11  Migrants mobilized by  leftist organizations are generally  “not fully 
radicalized in an ideological sense;” they  tend to be more concerned with issues that 
directly  affect their lives and less with lofty political and structural transformation.12  In 
the aftermath of a land invasion, there is often a surge in “‘demand-making’ 
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organizations” to acquire such things as land title and public utilities; as these demands 
are met and the community  becomes more established, participation and mobilization 
atrophy.13  Handelman’s study in Santiago again refutes the assumption that the majority 
of members in a mass movement necessarily share revolutionary ideals of leftist leaders. 
He did find that to some extent, communities in which radical organizers provided a 
significant amount of information had a tendency to become radicalized.  However, 
Handelman also cites numerous empirical studies in agreement with his findings, 
indicating a degree of sociopolitical conservatism and an inclination to avoid violence 
inherent among the urban poor.14 
The trend among academics of viewing both the urban and rural poor as 
conservative influences in their respective environments continues with the theories of 
Wayne Cornelius.  He asserts that urban poor conservatism is rooted in the physical and 
social investment that urban migrants have in their communities, including property, 
income, living conditions, and even opportunity.15   This has led migrants in urban 
settlements to display a low tolerance for risk, aside from the initial land invasion.  Even 
with high levels of frustration among migrants stemming from economic difficulties or 
failed government policies, Cornelius posits that migrants will turn more often towards 
incumbent elites or authoritarian-populists than to the militant left.16  
William Mangin’s study of land invasions within Lima noted that the singular act  of 
land invasion and subsequent defense is usually the extent of mobilization within 
communities, and is almost never anti-state.17   These pobladores would arrive at an 
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invasion site with “the materials to build a straw house, all their belongings, and a 
Peruvian flag.”18  Rather, it appears that popular illegal activity among the urban poor is 
generally  reserved for exceptional situations.  In the case of land invasions, a significant 
lack of available housing in the rapidly-growing urban centers of Latin America forced 
migrants to take drastic measures.  Once established, the invaders invest many years and 
relative fortunes in constructing their homes, which they view as an investment for the 
future of their family; it  is not illogical, then, that these communities “display a prevailing 
orientation for law and order.”19  The residents of these communities become landholders, 
and as such are stakeholders in the system that has allowed the communities to exist. 
This tends to dampen any radical tendencies.  Mangin asserts that the squatters are too 
busy  for “a revolutionary ‘let’s rise and kill the oligarchy’ approach,” content to defend 
their property with an attitude of “don’t let them take it away.”20  
Mobilization, especially  extra-legal mobilization, is not the only  avenue for 
peasants and the proletariat to effect change.  A generally free and fair democracy also 
provides sociopolitical empowerment through formal and informal democratic 
participation.  There is often a misconception that the urban poor routinely  vote with the 
political left.  Two separate articles, one by Henry Dietz and the other by Kenneth 
Roberts and Moisés Arce, study the voting behavior of the urban poor in Lima.  In his 
study of Peruvian elections between 1963 and 1983, Dietz found that “the urban poor 
define their major goals as material.”21  He states that the risk of extra-legal activity, the 
perceived need of government assistance, and the poor’s interest in the economy led to 
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non-violent political behavior by the lower-classes.22  Throughout the period of his study, 
Dietz found that while the poor were not averse to voting with the political left, their vote 
was much more strongly correlated with perceived self-interest than any loyalty to leftist 
ideology per se.  Roberts and Arce found similar results in their study of Peruvian 
elections from 1990-1995.  Class divisions are not the primary factor driving voting 
behavior.23  Instead, they found that the Peruvian poor voted for a non-leftist candidate, 
Alberto Fujimori, for pragmatic and clientelistic reasons. 
THE RISE (AND FALL) OF RADICALIZATION
The ability  for an insurgent movement to radicalize large segments of a population, 
even on a regional or local leve, is more difficult than it appears.  For reasons mentioned 
in the previous section, peasants (and, I would argue, most citizens) have a tendency  to 
resist radicalization.  Additionally, radicalization is something that is clearly not a lifelong 
condition; rather, it  is something that must be maintained and nurtured to maintain 
indefinitely.  The insurgencies of 1965 learned this lesson the hard way.  While the MIR 
did spend some time in pre-operational preparation, they focused their attention on 
military tasks such as constructing fortifications and conducting reconnaissance.  Neither 
group invested sufficiently in propaganda focused on the peasantry local to their areas of 
operations.  Likely, they believed that the mobilization whipped up by Hugo Blanco three 
years prior was lying dormant, waiting for direction from their movements.  Gott 
describes the pathetic miscalculation in this way:  “Hugo Blanco’s peasants seized the 
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land, but had no guns to defend their gains.  De la Puente’s well-armed guerrillas had no 
peasants to defend.”24  
Twenty years later, the heirs of De la Puente’s legacy — MRTA — faced similar 
problems.  Polay’s organization never controlled more than a small area in northern San 
Martín province in north-central Peru.  In part this was due to the complete 
overshadowing of Sendero Luminoso, who were able to deny  significant portions of rural 
Peru to MRTA, but simultaneously distracted Peruvian military  attention away from the 
relatively insignificant problem posed by MRTA.25   However, MRTA’s failure to 
radicalize the population also came from their ideological basis:  MRTA believed that the 
population was naturally radicalized and just needed prodding and focused its 
propaganda accordingly.26  In the end, MRTA, like the MIR and ELN before it, failed to 
create any significant popular radicalization.  Of the four Peruvian insurgencies, only 
Sendero was able to create any  radicalized populations with any  significance; yet their 
own strategy and tactics also caused them to lose control of the same.
More than the insurgents of 1965 or MRTA, Sendero Luminoso experienced 
significant gains and losses in the hearts and minds of Peruvian peasants.  One of 
Sendero’s stated conditions for success was popular support for the revolution manifested 
through active participation.  Even as late as 1988, Guzmán believed that a general 
insurrection would take place, and that Sendero could capitalize on it.27  Sendero believed 
that alienation would spawn mobilization; they used two primary approaches to create 
this alienation: indoctrination and targeted violence.  
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In the countryside, and particularly in Ayacucho and Andahuaylas, Sendero was 
able to radicalize significant segments of the population through indoctrination.  These 
regions, as in most areas where Sendero gained significant sway over the population, 
were communities in transition.  Handelman describes a transitional community  as one in 
which has a modest level of contact with nearby villages; residents become class-
conscious and gain an appreciation for their relative level of deprivation, creating 
alienation.  He continues that as the transition to modernization progresses, this trend 
reverses: as literacy, travel, and commercialization increase, alienation and radicalization 
decrease.28  It is doubtful Sendero understood this curvilinear relationship; nevertheless, 
they  were likely  drawn to, and found success in, these regions precisely  because of the 
prevailing sentiment of alienation found there.  They also likely discovered that they 
could sustain these feelings of alienation by  controlling access to material and intellectual 
imports, thus maintaining the communities in a state of perpetual transition.
Guzmán and his followers undoubtedly  learned from the failures of the insurgencies 
of the 1960‘s.  One lesson they likely learned was the necessity for deliberate and 
detailed planning and organization-building.  Beginning in the 1970’s, Guzmán and 
Sendero worked to gain control over the youth of the region by creating primary schools 
in the peasant villages and staffing them with teachers who were Shining Path 
adherents.29  Senderistas would then take over the governmental and leadership functions 
in these rural villages.30   This campaign worked well in Ayacucho, at  least initially. 
Election abstention and null and blank voting was significantly  higher (around 50% for 
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abstention from the municipal elections, 20 points higher than the national average) in 
Ayacucho during the two election cycles of 1980.  While interviewing peasants in the 
region in 1982, journalists reported overwhelming support for Sendero.  The local police 
estimated that 80% of one town either worked for or supported Sendero.31  
Certainly  Sendero was more successful in areas with transitional communities such 
as those near Ayacucho, where Sendero controlled the majority of information to the 
peasantry.  Ayacucho was one of the poorest regions in an already impoverished Peru.32 
The population already felt a sense of alienation, and “bitterness” over their exploitation 
from the not to distant feudal system and the extraordinary poverty  left in its wake 
remained near the fore of collective memory.33  Rural youth were particularly  drawn to 
the movement; in areas with significant educational gaps between older and younger 
generations, the “adults believed that if educated youth said something, it had to have 
some truth to it.”34   The peasantry initially viewed the Shining Path with hope and took 
them into their homes, provided them food, and participated in “people’s assemblies.”35 
Shining path offered a “system of order” that contrasted the “arbitrary  rule of the 
[existing civil] authorities,”36  acting like a patrón, “hard and inflexible yet ‘just.’”37 
Sendero used violence sparingly and for the benefit of the peasantry; their targets were 
usually wealthier peasants and local store owners.38
Around the end of 1982, just as it began to solidify control over the Ayacucho 
region, Sendero also began to experience problems with its civil programs and social 
control.  The timing of this turn was not coincidental to the entry of the Peruvian Armed 
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Forces into the government’s counterinsurgency campaign, but also began as Shining 
Path began to translate their rhetoric on community structure and expectations into 
concrete mandates.  Shining Path promoted collective farming, something familiar to 
many of the peasants; however, in the Sendero version, collective farming required 
peasants to provide significant amounts to Shining Path leadership.39   Sendero’s 
economic controls, such as the planting quotas, were designed to return the peasantry to 
subsistence farming; even if peasants had enough to trade, Sendero shut down farmers’ 
markets and prohibited trade with nearby towns.40   The expressed objective of these 
policies was to encircle the towns and cities and cut them off, effectively  strangling 
them.41  However, this strategy had quite the opposite result.  While the cities were not 
heavily dependent on trade and supplies with the peasantry  in the immediate vicinity, the 
same was not true for those peasants.42  Thus it was the peasants under Sendero control 
who bore the brunt of Sendero’s strategy.
Sendero’s reliance on young leadership and cultural insensitivity compounded its 
problems.  The insurgency  ignored traditional community authority  by placing 
inexperienced, idealistic youth in charge of communities, angering the older generation. 
Further breaking family bonds, Sendero began pressing children into its service under 
threat of death.  The peasant communities never really internalized Shining Path’s ideals; 
the insurgents remained outsiders in almost all areas under their control.43 Communities 
began to passively resist the Shining Path excesses; for many this included fleeing 
Sendero strongholds into the higher mountain areas or down to larger population centers 
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out of Shining Path control.  Sendero responded by closing off these avenues of escape 
and began using increasingly harsh tactics to control the civilian populace.  Sendero 
response to resistance commonly included the  killing entire families or killing parents 
and conscripting their children.44  As violence against and oppression of the peasantry  by 
Sendero grew, agricultural production in the “self-sufficient  economies” of Sendero 
strongholds declined.45   Coupled with an intensifying Peruvian military 
counterinsurgency campaign, living conditions for the peasants caught in the middle 
declined significantly.
The lack of security  for the radicalized peasantry under Sendero became, perhaps, 
the tipping point that moved the peasantry away from radicalization into passive and even 
active resistance to the Shining Path.  When the Peruvian armed forces began to attack 
Sendero strongholds, the insurgents employed the Maoist strategy of “strategic retreat,”46 
avoiding open conflict with the military.  The civilian populace that had believed it was 
living under Sendero protection suddenly found itself completely exposed to the military. 
Too often, especially  at first, the peasantry became the target of an angry and vengeful 
military with little understanding or regard for their human rights.  However, many 
peasants felt “sold out” by the false promised of security by  Sendero, and in time the 
armed forces came to be viewed as “a ‘lesser evil.’”47  As the excesses and betrayals of 
Shining Path increased, it was not able to maintain its ideological hold over any  large 
segment of peasantry in the central highlands.
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Sendero also sought to alienate and thus radicalize the population, especially those 
over whom they  could not exercise physical control, through violence.  The violence that 
defined operations by Sendero Luminoso was not coincidental or gratuitous.  “Violence,” 
Guzmán quoted from Mao, “is a universal law … without revolutionary violence … an 
old order cannot be overthrown.”48   Some observers have accused Sendero of using 
indiscriminate or senseless violence; this is not accurate.  For Sendero, violence was a 
tool used for a multitude of purposes, the primary  purpose being to create a sense of 
alienation between the populace and the government.  Sendero’s strategy was such that it 
both caused and benefited from “apocalyptic decline.”49   Enshrined in Sendero’s 
operational objectives, violence was meant to be targeted and deliberate in order to 
magnify the separation between the classes and incite mutual resentment and contempt. 
Some of Sendero’s objectives in the use of violence were to destroy  the establishment, 
instill fear, promote discipline, punish wrongdoing, and invite government backlash and 
reprisals upon the populace.50  
The Shining Path was surprisingly effective with their use of violence.  Perhaps 
their greatest success was to goad the Peruvian military into committing numerous 
massacres and human rights violations.  According to the final report of the Comisión de 
la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), between 61,007 and 77,552 people died as a result of 
the armed conflict in Peru between 1980 and 2000.51   Sendero Luminoso was found 
responsible for 46% of these deaths, the state (Army, police, etc) 30%, with 24% caused 
by other actors, such as MRTA, rondas campesinas, or paramilitary groups.  The 
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staggering level of violence and sheer number of fatalities did not have the desired effect 
for Sendero’s strategy.
In the early  years of the war, Sendero was able to dominate large segments of the 
rural populace, many of whom exhibited passive support  or sympathy for the terrorist 
group.  As the government ratcheted up  counterinsurgency  operations, the peasantry 
became caught in a crossfire between the military and Sendero; the terrorist  group found 
it increasingly  difficult to protect the occupants of the territory  they  controlled.  At times, 
Sendero even orchestrated violence against the peasantry by  their own hand or that  of the 
government.  Often, Shining Path militants would attack a military  target, then escape 
past a village, inviting the military to punish the village for Sendero’s actions and leaving 
the peasants feeling betrayed.52  This tactic initially increased support for Shining Path; 
however, as the peasantry began to associate the violence with Sendero’s authoritarian 
ideology, they began to withdraw their support.53
While Sendero’s campaign of violence was successful in generating criticism of 
state impotence, the result became an increase for more state security, not a demand for 
state withdrawal.  In the late 1980’s, the armed forces began to temper their tactics, 
implementing more of a “non-genocidal authoritarian strategy,” even as Sendero 
atrocities became more egregious to peasant sensibilities.54   The government also 
sponsored civil defense rondas campesinas, giving the peasantry in many locations the 
ability  to provide for their own defense.  Arming and empowering the peasantry enabled 
the first real strategic victory by  the state against Sendero, which became “trapped in a 
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kind of trench warfare against the peasants.” 55  The sympathies of the peasantry  shifted 
back towards the state.
While Sendero realized some initial successes alienating peasants in rural areas, it 
never gained much traction in Lima.  Sendero’s campaign of violence aimed at alienation 
came later to the city  than the countryside.  Between 1982 and 1983, Sendero operations 
in Lima increased, and the Metropolitan Committee appeared to transition from simple 
propaganda to armed actions against the socioeconomic system within the city.  Still, 
most actions in the capital city remained “propaganda through action” or a combination 
of agitation and sabotage.56   It was not until 1986 that Sendero began expanding its 
operations.  In contrast, campaigns in Sendero strongholds such as Ayacucho had 
arguably achieved a “generalization of the guerrilla struggle” by 1982, and had long since 
begun their conquest and expansion of the movement’s support base.57 
Sendero attempted to invigorate its urban campaign in June 1986 with a coordinated 
prison uprising in three Lima prisons holding Senderista leadership.  The government 
responded to the uprising by massacring most of the Sendero inmates; many were 
apparently  summarily executed.  The public outrage over this event may  have provided 
Sendero with a major public relations coup at the expense of the García administration, 
but it also decimated the leadership of the Metropolitan Committee, which apparently  had 
been running operations in Lima from within the prisons.  Despite the loss of so many 
leaders, Shining Path within Lima did not collapse, nor did it halt its urban operations. 
Yet despite the Metropolitan Committee’s phoenix-like revival, a close examination of 
101
data show that Sendero operations in Lima fell significantly and did not return to 
pre-1986 levels for over two years.58   By 1988, Sendero felt that it needed to give 
renewed attention to its operations in Lima; in a rare published interview in 1988, 
Guzmán acknowledged that Sendero’s foothold in the cities was not as advanced as it was 
in the countryside.59  
The greatest Sendero-initiated violence in Lima occurred after Shining Path 
adjusted its urban operations in 1988.60   Shining Path began to increase its organizing 
within universities and left-wing community  organizations and intensified its vigorous 
campaign against the political left.  Assassinations, bombings, and armed strikes became 
familiar occurrences.  By 1989, Peru’s economy was on a downward spiral, Sendero had 
a firm hold on the countryside, and it appeared that they  were becoming all too prevalent 
in Lima.  A senior Senderista captured by  security  services in 1988 indicated that Shining 
Path leadership believed the Peruvian state would collapse within a few years.  In May of 
1991, the Shining Path Central Committee publicly echoed this sentiment by declaring 
that the revolution had passed from Strategic Defense and was entering Strategic 
Equilibrium.61 
As the violence continued into the 1990’s, Sendero began targeting popularly 
elected community leaders and even the general populace of the city.  Observers began to 
view a failed state in Peru as a real possibility; ironically  it was Sendero whose downfall 
was looming.  Despite Sendero’s activity  within Lima, it  never could achieve its stated 
conditions for success, namely  obtaining popular support and moral agreement.  In part, 
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this was due to an eventual disassociation of Shining Path by the political left, brought 
about by Sendero’s violent campaign to bring the political left in line.  A series of high-
profile murders of popular leftist leaders in Lima, most prominently the brutal 
assassination of highly respected community leader María Elena Moyano in Villa El 
Salvador62 as well as attacks on sectors of the working-class, created resentment among 
the populace.  Sendero never lost  popular support within Lima because it  never gained it. 
Its violent actions aimed progress its tactical objectives with little progress towards 
operational or strategic goals.  As state security  services gained experience, capability, 
and competence, they began to dismantle Sendero’s operations in Lima in the early 
1990’s, culminating in the capture of Guzmán and many senior leaders.  Without a base 
of support, Sendero’s actions in the city dwindled away and the metropolitan committee 
quickly faded into irrelevance.
THE CONSERVATIVE INFLUENCE OF SELF-INTEREST
The ominous specter of Sendero Luminoso overshadowed Peru from the 1980’s 
well into the 1990’s.  By all accounts, even the most optimistic citizens had, at times, 
doubts as to the ability of the Peruvian state to withstand Shining Path’s onslaught.  But 
the passage of time brings perspective; despite all of the devastation wrought by Sendero 
on Peru, the insurgency never attracted widespread loyalty and certainly did not generate 
a popular mobilization.  Guzman and his Shining Path comrades were not alone in this 
failure; the MIR, ELN, and MRTA all experienced similar results.  Ironically, the non-
revolution of Hugo Blanco’s land invasions63 achieved relatively greater mobilization and 
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more lasting results than the ill-fated attempts of the revolutionary  movements.  One 
strong explanatory variable for these results is self-interest.  
The Peruvian insurgencies may have needed and expected the poor to revolt.  Yet 
both in the sierra and the city, social conditions were not conducive for such high-risk 
behavior.  The peasantry and proletariat possess an innate aversion to revolution because 
they, as individuals, tend to be risk averse, as demonstrated in the literature of Handelman 
and Cornelius.  What’s more, the actions of the poor generally reflect self-interested 
decision-making, seeking to maximize their own welfare as well as that of their families 
and, to a lesser extent, their communities.  Conducting land invasions, both in the city  or 
in the countryside, is a risk-filled proposition that the poor undertake only  when they 
perceive a major risk by not taking action.  In the city this occurs during significant 
housing shortages; in the countryside it  occurs when peasants perceive (accurately or not) 
that a lack of land and of alternatives to working the land are present and insurmountable, 
and that they have no legal ability to change this.  
It is important to remember that even when land invasions occur, both in the city 
and the countryside, they are usually  not inherently  anti-government.  As mentioned 
previously, land invaders in both urban and rural settings frequently  carried Peruvian 
flags as a sign that their activity was not an act of rebellion, even as they  participated in 
decidedly  illegal activity.64  When the peasants near Cuzco who had participated in the 
mobilizations with Blanco were presented with the opportunity  to expand their 
revolutionary  activities through the operations of De la Puente and Béjar, they 
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overwhelmingly  refused to take part.  Gott and others argue that  the lack of peasant 
support for the MIR and ELN can be directly  attributed to the governmental land reforms 
under Belaúnde administration in the short time between Blanco’s campaign and the 
revolution attempts.65  This merely reinforces the idea that it  is difficult to radicalize and 
mobilize the poor beyond what they deem necessary in their self-interest.  The peasants 
of the Cuzco region and the migrants in Lima both made risk-benefit judgements 
regarding the utility of land invasions and the possibility of government oppression.  In 
these cases, government oppression was decidedly minimal vis-á-vis the opportunity to 
acquire land.  Clearly, the peasantry  and proletariat were only willing to risk illegal action 
in extreme and limited circumstances.
The effects of self-interest can cut both ways.  Sendero initially was able to leverage 
poblador risk aversion manifested through tolerance.  On the legal left, more extreme 
members initially were willing to tolerate Sendero’s operations in the city, viewing them 
as merely extreme and a bit misguided.66  The moderate left did not support  Shining Path; 
however, as they were unwilling to collaborate with the military  or state, the most they 
could do was refuse to actively  support the insurgency.67   In the late 1980’s, however, 
Sendero experienced frustration over a lack of popular and began “headhunting,” sending 
a message to leftist leaders and commoners alike that “the party knew where they lived 
and could take reprisals.”68  Sendero conducted numerous brutal assassinations against 
popular left-wing organizations and leaders, the most glaring of which being the vicious 
murder of María Elena Moyano of Villa El Salvador. This strategy had the opposite effect 
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than intended: lower-class communities began to reassess the threat  of Sendero’s violence 
— suddenly it was not any  more dangerous to oppose Sendero than it was to provide 
tepid, passive support.  
In the latter years of the Sendero insurgency, the political left and migrant 
communities, especially trade unions and left-wing groups, provided both passive and 
active resistance to Sendero.69   Members of the left began an often active resistance 
against the Shining Path, even organizing peace rallies in defiance of Sendero’s 
violence.70  Sendero’s position among the working class was poor enough to cause 
Guzmán to admit, in his 1988 interview, that  Shining Path had not recruited large 
numbers of the urban proletariat.71   While not every left-wing organization resisted 
Sendero Luminoso, the two largest trade unions in Lima actively  did so, expelling 
members with ties to Shining Path.72  By the 1990’s, the legal left felt strongly  enough 
about the threat Sendero posed that many members began to work with the Peruvian 
military.73   While Sendero was initially able to use self-interest  to prevent active 
resistance in many  areas,  neither it nor the other insurgencies were able to mobilize large 
portions of the peasantry  to undertake dangerous and illegal anti-government uprisings. 
Inciting the peasantry  into revolution is a major undertaking — a much harder process 
than the insurgents in Peru understood.
SELF-DETERMINATION EXPRESSED THROUGH DEMOCRACY
The peasantry  and proletariat of Peru not only resisted radicalization and focused on 
activities in their self-interest, they also were, generally  speaking, well-engaged in the 
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political process.  The political system in a democracy provides many choices for 
individuals and can, in several ways, provide a telling picture of the influence wielded by 
an insurgency and the level of radicalization of a populace. There are many combinations 
and permutations of response to an election; I mention but some of the most basic here. 
In Peru, voting is required by  law; thus, a large-scale refusal to vote (boycotting the 
election) or a failure to properly  register a vote (with spoiled or blank ballots) may 
indicate a rejection of state authority or at least a significant level of fear of participation 
by the voting population.  Voting for incumbent candidates or those who support the 
status quo likely  indicates a level of confidence in the current  system, if not approval. 
Voting for alternate candidates (voting against the party in office) indicates a level of 
confidence in the system even while voicing dissatisfaction with the party in power. 
Finally, voluntarily  engaging in the political process outside of the legally-mandated 
voting structure (i.e., the informal democratic process) indicates not only  confidence but 
also personal investment in the system.  Thus, the democratic process became one of the 
most significant manifestations of poblador resistance to the insurgencies of Sendero 
Luminoso and MRTA.  This resistance took place through both formal and informal 
democratic participation within the migrant communities of Lima.
Democracy has a long and convoluted history in Peru.  During the twentieth century 
alone, five different constitutions and eleven coups d’état have marked the tumultuous 
political landscape of national politics.  Guzmán calculated that 1980 was a time of 
weakness for the state.  As the Army stepped down from power, Guzmán correctly 
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estimated that the incoming civilian administration would be hesitant to deploy the 
military to engage his forces.  Similarly, he correctly guessed that the newly elected 
regime would be struggling to establish legitimacy and would not be able to react  quickly 
or decisively to revolutionary operations.  What he failed to account for was the 
underlying desire for democratic participation by the Peruvian people.  Ironically, the 
period from 1980-1992 consisted of the longest period of constitutional rule 
uninterrupted by a coup in almost half a century.  For the first time in the lifetime of most 
Peruvians, three free and fair elections marked the transfer of power between three 
democratically elected presidents, and a generation of young Peruvians — those who 
reached legal voting age after 1965 — could participate in the democratic process for the 
first time in their lives.  
Formal participation in all of the elections between 1978 and 1996 was relatively 
high.  Palmer noted that during the 1986 municipal elections, there was an inverse 
correlation between high levels of Shining Path violence and a vote for the political left.74 
The national elections of 1990, in particular, were a significant blow to the credibility of 
Sendero, whose explicit  objective was to disrupt the process.  An even stronger anti-
insurgency sentiment manifested itself in the 1990 presidential elections.  Not only was 
voter turnout high as the nation elected a centrist president, but the bulk of Fujimori’s 
support came from voters in the lower socioeconomic tiers.75  At the height of Sendero’s 
violent campaign against Peruvian elections, the urban poor risked Shining Path 
retribution — in the form of chopping off the purple-stained finger of those caught voting 
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— to make their voices heard.76  The high turnout and election of a centrist, third-party 
candidate in 1990 was viewed by  many as a repudiation of Sendero’s methods and 
goals.77  Sendero’s strategy in Lima was an unequivocal failure as evidenced both by the 
absence of any semblance of urban uprising, and by the continuing strength of popular 
participation in the democratic process.
Beyond mere participation, voting patterns of the proletariat provided another 
indication of Sendero’s lack of popular support.  In 1980, Peru elected Fernando 
Belaúnde, a conservative; in 1984, Alan García, a leftist; in both 1990 and 1995, Alberto 
Fujimori, a centrist.  In each of these cases, the winning candidate received a majority  of 
the poblador vote.  Municipal elections in 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, and 1992 showed 
considerable vote-switching, especially among the lower socioeconomic sectors.78  While 
this was not a direct refutation of the insurgencies per se, it clearly shows that lower-class 
loyalty was to perceived self-interest rather than the ideological left, political or 
otherwise.
Finally, the informal political process provided yet another powerful example of 
both the lower-classes willingness to participate beyond simple voting, and their faith in 
the democratic process as preferable to revolution.  Because voting is mandatory, there is 
a valid argument that Peruvians voted in large numbers during the 1980’s and 1990’s to 
avoid punishment.79   This argument diminishes significantly in light  of the informal, 
purely  voluntary democratic participation of the lower-classes.  The significant levels of 
informal participation by pobladores in Lima during the 1980’s and 90’s, as documented 
109
by Dietz,80 demonstrated their perception that time and energy spent on informal political 
activity was a worthwhile investment towards improving their quality of life.  Even as 
confidence in the state dropped significantly during the economic and security  crises of 
the late 1980’s, polls showed that 80% of the proletariat preferred democracy  over 
military rule.81
CONCLUSIONS
Each of the insurgencies believed, based on their ideology, that the peasantry and 
urban proletariat would mobilize against  the established state; in practice, none of the 
four groups ever came close to effecting popular mobilization or radicalization.  On the 
contrary, the peasants in the Andes and the migrant communities of Lima’s barriadas 
showed significant resistance to the attempts at radicalizing the population by insurgents. 
Of the four groups, Sendero Luminoso was able to effect the most radicalization; still, in 
some areas under their control, they inspired sympathy, but only  limited participation, for 
their goals of social revolution.  Sendero was not able to maintain its sway  over  these 
communities, however, and even evoked popular counter-radicalization by a majority of 
the nation.  Their attempts to alienate the citizens from the state instead alienated the 
people from Sendero.  
At the heart of the matter is a natural inclination for individuals to work in their 
own self-interest and prefer self-determination.  Individuals generally  work toward what 
they  perceive to be their own self-interest.  Contrary to the doctrinal foundations of the 
insurgents, who held that the peasantry  and proletariat have a natural inclination to revolt 
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against the oppressive capitalistic system, the peasantry and proletariat  felt  no such 
natural compulsion, merely desiring to acquire a reasonably decent quality  of life for 
themselves and their families.  Any alternatives were processed through a risk-reward 
analysis.  At times this produced benign support for the insurgents; more often — and 
over long periods of time — the analysis favored working within existing state structures. 
In particular, formal as well as informal democratic processes provided an avenue for 
individuals to exercise self-determination.  The choices made by the peasantry  and 
proletariat indicate a preference to vote in a manner which best served their self-interest; 
this was not necessarily in alignment with the desires of the political left and other self-
proclaimed representatives of the poor.  
The strength of a democracy truly is rooted in the its citizens.  In Peru, the 
insurgencies were not able to convince the people that revolution would server their best 
interests, both in the idealized end-state presented and the risks required in its 
achievement.  Without popular support through radicalization and mobilization against 
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CHAPTER V:  CONCLUSIONS
Social revolutions, according to Skocpol, differ from other types of conflicts in that 
they  simultaneously combine a coincidence of structural change with class upheaval a 
coincidence of social and political transformation.1  Marx promoted the inevitability of 
proletarian rule; Lenin espoused the inevitability of proletarian revolution.  In practice, 
however, successful social revolution is not a common occurrence.  The successful 
revolutionary  must overcome not only the structural power of the state but also the social 
resistance of the populace.
The insurgencies of Peru began their operations at something of a disadvantage 
because of the disunity among the political left.  From the early days of the two main 
leftist parties (APRA and the PCP), the Peruvian left has struggled to find consensus on 
goals, methods, and leadership.  Compounding their difficulties, the MIR, ELN, and to an 
extent MRTA based their organizational framework around the Cubanist model of 
revolution.  Unfortunately for the revolutionaries, this model has only worked once. 
Additionally, MRTA faced the challenge of revolutionary  competition; relatively small 
and insignificant, MRTA constantly struggled to be seen, heard, and relevant amid the 
revolutionary  din of Sendero’s campaign.  Shining Path, on the other hand, arguably had 
the best strategy of the four.  Based on a Maoist  revolutionary model, Sendero’s strategy 
was well suited to the type of campaign all four insurgencies promoted: peasant-based 
rural revolution.  
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The only problem with rural revolution is that it usually is best applied in a rural 
setting.  Peru, however, was an urban-centric nation.  Beyond that, other conditions 
common to successful social revolutions were either missing from or distorted within the 
Peruvian insurgencies.  The insurgencies were led by marginal elites, but these leaders 
were far better at speech-crafting than state-making.  Further, the elite leaders could not 
consolidate support from a fractured Peruvian left behind their movement; some leaders 
could not even create unity internally within their organizations.  
In addition to the organizational difficulties of the revolutions, they also faced a 
serious challenge in the level of urbanization of Peru.  Peru in the 1960’s was a nation 
whose economy had only recently  become primarily non-agrarian; by the 1980’s, 
however, any  notion of an agrarian economy was completely baseless.  More than the 
national level of urbanization, Peru also possessed an incredibly  dense primate capital 
city.  The complexities of creating and implementing a successful urban guerrilla strategy 
were compounded in and by Lima.  This was more difficult  because of the ideologies 
used by the insurgents.  The group MRTA based their strategy  on a Cuban model of 
revolution which, in its exported form provided little guidance for urban operations. 
Sendero was attempting to maintain doctrinal loyalty to Maoism, which downplayed the 
importance of cities.
Finally, the insurgencies also had to deal with state structure and power.  In states 
where social revolutions were successful, the state and military  were beginning to fail 
apart from and prior to revolution.  Yet in Peru, state and military structures were 
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generally  strong through most of the revolutionary periods.  The exception was a time 
during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when Peru’s state and military were grappling 
with economic and political difficulties in addition to combatting two violent revolutions. 
It is possible to argue that state structures were not actually failing, merely struggling. 
State services were not suspended and military  operations continued.  But in reality, this 
moment shows a weakness in the structural-theory approach to analyzing the Peruvian 
revolutions.  It indicates that state stability  is not, according to the marxist view, 
“basically organized coercion.”2   On the contrary, state power is as much about 
sociopolitical consensus as it is about structural coercive mechanisms.
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the insurgencies in Peru was their failure to 
inspire popular radicalization and mobilization.  All four insurgencies acknowledged the 
requirement for such social uprising to occur, but all four also assumed this upheaval 
would spawn naturally  from a ready and willing peasantry  and proletariat.  Contrary  to 
insurgent doctrines, the populace clearly had no natural urge to revolt.  Rather, only 
through extreme effort and control could one insurgency, Sendero Luminoso, affect 
radicalization and minor mobilization from a small portion of the nation; additionally, 
these gains were unsustainable over time.  By in large, Sendero’s campaign to alienate the 
populace from the government did not inspire significant radicalization or mobilization 
even as it inspired, initially, some alienation.  And continued campaigning by Shining 
Path then began to have an opposite effect, turning the populace against the insurgents.
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The reaction of the populace to the insurgencies, especially to Sendero, could be 
characterized as one based on self-interest.  Peasants and urban migrants tend to be risk-
averse.  Generally, they will conduct illegal action only when they feel as if they  have no 
other realistic choice, only collectively, and with limited goals and objectives. 
Revolutionary  social mobilization, while possible, is quite improbable without extremely 
onerous sociopolitical conditions.  In Peru, extra-legal land invasions showed the extent 
to which the peasantry and urban proletariat were willing to take risk outside of the 
existing system.  Beyond that, these same individuals and communities proved quite 
willing not only to live within the existing system but to enforce it.  Disruption to the 
status-quo was viewed as a risk; the response by the peasantry  and proletariat was 
generally  whatever they  viewed as providing the best  results with minimal risk. 
Frequently this was passivity or non-commitment; when Sendero increasingly raised the 
risk of passivity, the peasantry and proletariat chose passive and active resistance.
One of the ways that the populace could both engage in self-determination and, at 
times, resist insurgencies was to participate in the formal democratic process.  This was 
especially true in the 1980’s and 1990’s.  The trends of lower-class voting patterns 
indicated a clear preference for self-interest regardless of a candidate’s party or 
ideological affiliation.  Further, involvement in the informal democratic process 
demonstrated a perception of active investment in the existing state among the voting 
poor.  
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The sociopolitical trends in Peru ran contrary to the ideological perceptions of the 
insurgents.  Combined with a generally strong state structure and less-than-ideal 
insurgent leadership, the failures of the 1960’s and 1980’s revolutionary  attempts are not 
particularly surprising.  The structural and sociopolitical characteristics of the functioning 
democracy  in Peru clearly were not  conducive to popular mobilization and successful 
social revolution.
Both Luís de la Puente and Héctor Béjar believed that their guerrilla focos could 
instigate a revolution in Peru.  This concept originates from the first  page of Che 
Guevara’s book, where he claims that “it is not necessary to wait until all conditions for 
making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.”3  Evident by their words and 
deeds, it is clear the MIR and ELN leaders were not as familiar with the second page of 
Guevara’s book, where he cautioned that “the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted” 
where there is a popularly elected democratic government.4
In this study, I examine how one nation resisted multiple revolutionary attempts 
from four different groups with similar (Communist) ideologies.  It would be interesting 
to extrapolate the concepts in this study  to an array  of revolutions, both successful and 
failed, examining the same variables to see if similar conclusions are warranted. 
Furthermore, from a policy  perspective, it  would be useful to examine whether the 
structural and sociopolitical resistance to insurgency is exclusive to democratic situations. 
Anecdotally, it  would appear that authoritarian regimes are also able to suppress 
insurgencies, although it may  be for different reasons.  Similarly, established and strong 
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democracies appear to have much less experience with domestic  insurgency.  Thus a 
study on whether transitioning democracies, those whose democratic processes are either 
new or frequently revert to non-democratic means (such as military coups), are more 
susceptible to insurgencies and whether they are better able to resist them in proportion to 
their level of democratization.  This, then, might answer whether external actors (states, 
international governmental organizations, and the like) could promote democracy as a 
form of counterinsurgency strategy.
Nevertheless, the lesson found in the Peruvian insurgencies is that absent favorable 
structural and sociopolitical conditions, proponents of social revolution are at an extreme 
disadvantage.  These elements were not present in Peru during the attempted revolutions 
of the 1960’s and 1980‘s, nor could they be created by the insurgencies.  Lacking the 
necessary  conditions for revolution, the insurgencies could not radicalize the populace 
nor inspire popular mobilization.  It may provide little consolation to the tens of 
thousands who died as a result of the violence, but the revolutions of the Peruvian 
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